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The legal basis of this paper is twofold. First is that the alignment of law, policy and 
practice in the treatment of refugees as per International and national laws is lacking. 
Second is that the existing legal framework relating to the movement, registration and 
treatment of refugees is lacking. This paper deals with preventing the social ill of radicalism 
and by extension terrorist activity by dealing with the root cause which will be proven to 
be radicalisation. The ultimate aim of this paper is to try to partly offer a solution to violent 
extremist activity and radicalisation and is directed towards finding measures that would 
do so. 
This paper will begin by outlining a general introduction to radicalism and violent 
extremism in Kenya. This introduction will be introduced from a purely social point of 
view, in order to grasp the social issues. Thereafter, the contributing factors to 
radicalisation and extremist violence will be looked at. A distinction between causes and 
catalysts will be made, with a brief outline of each and how they relate to the individual. 
Thereafter, this paper will look at how various organisations have attempted to combat 
radicalism and terrorism. This analysis will compare local and international attempts at 
solving the problem, with a focus on Kenya’s legal framework. Criticism and support of 
the current methods used to counter terrorism will be through the lens of the preventive 
value of these strategies. 
Investigation of hypotheses will then be done through research questions. The level of 
refugee participation in terrorist activity will then be ascertained through investigation. 
Once this has been determined, the legal means to counter refugee terrorist activity 
available to the state will be analysed. Within this analysis will be an investigation of 
whether the state follows legal principles, such as non-refoulment. Then, a comparison of 
possible solutions in different jurisdictions will be made. There will be special focus on 
legal integration as a possible solution. 
Finally, the paper will make findings based on what is presented. These findings will be on 
whether the state follows the legal framework surrounding treatment of refugees. Also, to 
what extent the refugees are to blame for terrorist activity and whether there are any 
weaknesses in the legal framework itself dealing with the treatment and integration of 
refugees. The paper will conclude by making the recommendations based on the findings 
of the topical issues. These are for a more appropriate integration policy (including 
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 1.1 Background to the Study 
Kenya faces a national security threat from violent extremism.1The country’s major towns 
of Nairobi and Mombasa have in the past experienced Al-Qaeda (the terror group 
associated with Osama bin Laden, whose main aim was the disruption of US domination 
in world affairs) inspired attacks with the August 1998 bombings of the US embassy in the 
capital and the 2002 bombings of an Israeli owned hotel in Mombasa.2  
With the 2011 incursion of the Kenya Defence Forces into Somalia, there has been a new 
security challenge that has resulted in an escalation in radical extremism attacks 
particularly from the Al-Shabaab, the Somali based terror group whose aim is to establish 
shariah law in Somalia and neighbouring territories.3  
Kenya’s porous border with Somalia closer to major population centres, its international 
status, soft targets such as the tourist sector, the comparatively high number of Kenyan 
foreign fighters within the ranks of Al-Shabaab, presence of terror cells in Kenya and high 
corruption levels are other contributors to this phenomenon.4  
The violent extremist group has in the recent past carried out retaliatory attacks in the 
country resulting to the deaths of many innocent civilians. The April 2015 Garissa 
University College attack was the second deadliest terrorist attack in the country since the 
1998 US Embassy attack claiming the lives of 142 college students.5  
 
                                                          
1 ‘Mwere D: Terror groups pose biggest threat to Kenya’s security-NIS’, Daily Nation 
https://www.nation.co.ke/news/NIS-terrorism-security-threat/1056-4103606-b06cccz/index.html on 20 
September 2017. 
2 Warah R, War crimes, AuthorHouse, Bloomington, 2014, 105. 
3 ‘Kibor F: Terrorism threat stalking us but we shall crush it, Uhuru says’, Standard Digital 
https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2001269042/terrorism-threat-stalking-us-but-we-shall-crush-it-
uhuru-says on 9 February 2017. 
4 Brendon J & Ruto D, ‘Why Al-Shabab attacks Kenya: Questioning the narrative paradigm’, Terrorism 
and Political Violence Journal, (2017). 




The threat to Kenya is made more peculiar because the country accommodates many 
Somali refugees, majority of who live in the designated refugee camps of Dadaab and 
Kakuma. Other refugees live among the local population as urban refugees in Nairobi and 
other towns.6  
While this latter group of refugees is de-facto integrated into the local host community, 
they like the encamped refugees are not legally integrated and this is perceived to 
exacerbate the security risk.7  
 1.2 Research Problem  
The Kenyan government has on varied occasions claimed that Somali refugees pose a 
peculiar threat to the country’s national security.8 This ever-present threat has been 
aggravated by the poor treatment of Somali refugees by the State and the xenophobic 
attitudes by the local population that lead to radicalization and as a result violent 
extremism.9 
This paper proceeds on the premise that Somali refugees are not allowed to be legally 
integrated into the local communities due to the encampment approach stipulated by the 
Kenyan laws.10 The research will interrogate whether systematic integration of Somali 
refugees will result in making them have a better sense of belonging and give them stakes 
in the country. It will delve to establish whether this will result in de-radicalization and 
hence a reduction in cases of violent extremism. 
 1.3 Hypotheses 
a) Failure to locally integrate Somali refugees has led to an increased risk of violent 
extremism in Kenya. 
                                                          
6United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, ‘Kenya Comprehensive refugee Program’, (2016), 3-7.  
7 Abdi A,‘Urban refugees reintegration: A case study of Nairobi’s Eastleigh Somali refugees ‘, Thesis for 
Masters Degree in Armed Conflict and Peace Studies, University of Nairobi, November 2010. 
8‘Sham S: Kenya to close refugee camps amid security and economic concerns’, Deutsche Welle  
http://www.dw.com/en/kenya-to-close-refugee-camps-amid-security-and-economic-concerns/a-19240991 
on 7 May 2016. 
9 ‘Haron M: Kenya’s immigrant crackdown: Harassing Somalis will not counter terrorism’, Ceasefire 
Magazine https://ceasefiremagazine.co.uk/kenyas-immigrant-crackdown-harassing-somalis-counter-
terrorism/  on 18 June 2014. 
10 Section 16 (4) and 17(f), Refugees Act, 2006 (Act No. 13 of 2006). 
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b) Systematic integration of Somali refugees among host communities in Kenya will 
result-in a reduction in violent extremism in the country. 
 
 1.4 Research Questions 
a) Are Somali refugees involved in terrorism?  
b) If so, what are the suite of legal responses that the Kenyan State has in responding 
to violent Somali refugee extremism? 
c) Is integration a factor in reducing violent extremism? 
a. How far Are the Somali refugees in Kenya integrated into the local host 
population? 
b. What are the reasons as to why the Somali refugees in Kenya are not 
integrated into the local population? 
c. Could the systematic integration of Somali refugees among host 
communities produce a reduction in violent extremism in Kenya?  
 1.5 Literature Review 
Violent Extremism is an ever-present threat in Kenya.11 In recent times Al-Shabaab attacks 
on innocent civilians has led to the deaths of so many people the deadliest being the Garissa 
University attack and the Westgate Mall siege. 
A Pew Research Centre survey published in March 2013 found that 55% of Kenyans 
believe that terrorism constitutes a major threat to the country12- violent extremism has 
caused an atmosphere of fear and terror in the daily lives of people in Northern Kenya, the 
Coast and Nairobi. It is therefore paramount to research on ways of reducing the threat of 
violent extremism so as to reduce the threat and fear among the local population. 
Otiso KM in his article in the Kenya Studies Review Journal gives reasons why Kenya 
faces terrorist attacks as: (1) its close ties to western countries (2) its vibrant coastal beach 
tourism that threatens local Islamic culture and (3) the perception that the country’s 
                                                          
11 ‘David Mwere: Terror groups pose biggest threat to Kenya’s security-NIS’ 
12 Pew Research Centre, ‘Climate change and financial instability seen as the top Global threats’, Survey 
Report 24 June 2013.  
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predominantly Christian population is an obstacle to the Islamization of Eastern Africa.13 
Brendon J and Dominic R have also pointed out that the Kenya security establishment’s 
draconian tactics against the Kenyan Muslims and other communities (like the refugee 
community) have led to anger, frustration and, in some cases, radicalization.14 Their 
assertion suggests that such methods as integration may increase the trust between refugee 
communities and the Kenyan state.  
The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) in its policy brief on development in 
Kenya states that violent extremism has had a great negative impact on the Kenyan 
economy. It has affected infrastructure, physical and human capital, productivity and 
economic growth.15 The brief paints a picture of the negative effects of violent extremism 
on the country’s economy. Thus, exploring local integration of refugees as a way of 
reducing instances of violent extremism may help the general economy of the country. 
In its February 2017 meeting report, the Rift valley Institute asserts that hard military and 
security approaches have not successfully addressed the threat of violent extremism and 
that a new approach of countering violent extremism has emerged that promotes preventive 
programming that aims to address the drivers of violent extremism that is a departure from 
reactive counterterrorism measures.16Local integration of Somali refugees can be presented 
as a counter violent extremism option. 
Various human rights organizations’ reports and accounts have documented the abuses 
against Somali refugees in Kenya. These abuses include periodic raids, beatings, police 
round-ups, extortion, torture and rapes. The Human Rights Watch report of 12th May 2014 
describes some of these violations.17 
Another report by Human Rights Watch that documented these abuses further stated that 
although the abuses do not necessarily translate into violent extremism because many 
                                                          
13 Otiso K, ‘Kenya in the crosshairs of global terrorism’, Kenya Studies Review Journal, (2009), 108. 
14 Brendon J & Ruto Pkalya ‘Why Al-Shabab attacks Kenya: Questioning the narrative paradigm’. 
15 ‘UNDP: Articulating the pathways of the impact of terrorism and violent extremism on the Kenyan 
economy’, Policy Brief 1/2017, October 2017. 
16 ‘Rift Valley Institute: Violent extremism in Kenya- risk and resilience’, Meeting Report, February 2017. 
17 https://hrw.org/news/2014/05/12/kenya-end-abusive-round-ups on 12 May 2014. 
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Somali refugees have suffered persecution in the hands of radical groups like Al-Shabaab 
back in Somalia, the existence of radicalism as a result of abuses by the Kenyan state has 
aided those carrying out violent extremism attacks in Kenya.18 
Kenyan journalist, Rasna Warah has highlighted the Kenyan state and local population’s 
antagonistic attitude towards ethnic Somalis- both Kenyan and Somali. She interrogates 
the problem of the mistreatment of ethnic Somalis by highlighting the abuses they face in 
the Kenyan state; and discrimination and hostile attitude they face from the public. 
Her book also gives a historical context in which the suspicions and mistrust between the 
ethnic Somalis and the various Kenyan governments since post-colonial period. 19 
In her article in the Journal for Refugee Studies, Elizabeth H. Campbell supports the idea 
of local integration of urban Somali refugees in Kenya arguing that they are not an 
economic burden as they are self-sufficient.20 
Local integration can thus be explored to see if it can deal with grievances of these 
harassment. By giving the refugees the same status as citizens, these abuses and harassment 
may reduce and therefore by extension a decrease in radicalization.    
Peter Kirui and Dr. John Mwarurie writing in the International Journal of Business and 
Social Sciences argue that the presence of refugees in Kenya poses national security 
threat.21 They seem to suggest getting rid of refugees all together. 
In their article exploring the development of radicalization in Kenya, the country’s foreign 
and military policy in Somalia is identified as a factor influencing the rising threat of 
radicalization in Kenya.22 
The study will rely on other reports by institutions dealing with human rights, refugee rights 
                                                          
18 https://www.hrw.org/report/2012/05/04/criminal-reprisals/kenyan-police-and-military-abuses-against-
ethnic-somalis on 4 May 2012. 
19 Warah, War crimes, 125-152. 
20 Campbell E, ‘Urban refugees in Nairobi: Problems of protection, mechanisms of survival, and 
possibilities for integration, 19 Journal of Refugees 3 (2006) 399-400.  
21 Kirui P, Mwarurie J, ‘The dilemma of hosting refugees: A focus on the insecurity, in north eastern 
Kenya’ 3 International Journal of Business and social Sciences (2012) 161. 
22 Petterson W, ‘Islamic Radicalization in Kenya’, Joint Force Quarterly 78 (2015) 16-22. 
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and government policy. These include reports by Kenya National Commission on Human 
Rights (KNCHR)23,  United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR); refugee 
agencies like the Norwegian/Danish Refugee Agency; and Amnesty International.   
This study seeks to bridge the gap in countering violent extremism by interrogating the 
option of local integration of Somali refugees and seeks to get answers as to whether if 
adopted, it will lead to a decrease in radicalization and hence a reduction in instances of 
violent extremism. 
 1.6 Approach and Methodology 
This study will use desktop qualitative research along with traditional black letter 
doctrinal legal analysis. It will adopt secondary sources of information. It will evaluate 
the issues through looking into books, journals, reports and other relevant research 
papers. It will also look into primary information such as news material from newspapers 
and news websites. 
The study will investigate into case studies such as the trial of the suspects of the 
Westgate Attack. The attack is the highest profile violent extremism attacks in the 
country as it has happened in the recent past, its trial is ongoing, and the events unfolded 
in the glare of the public through the media. 
The case study will look into reports on possible involvement of Somali refugees in the 
planning and execution of the attack.  
The study will also analyze the historical context to my research problem. It will look 
into the antagonism between Kenya and Somalia. Kenya has a sizeable ethnic Somali 
population that is connected to the Somalis of Somalia. This group has experienced 
historical injustices and the civil war in Somalia has affected its relationship with the 
Kenyan state. 
                                                          
23 ‘KNCHR: The error of fighting terror with terror- preliminary report of the KNCHR investigations on 
human rights abuses in the ongoing crackdown against terrorism’, KNCHR 
http://www.knchr.org/Portals/0/CivilAndPoliticalReports/Final%20Disappearances%20report%20pdf.pdf 
on September 2015. 
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 1.7 Theoretical Framework  
This research proceeds on the principles of national and international refugee rights as a 
reality and necessity when dealing with refugees and the international community at large. 
These principles, despite efforts to contravene them by the Kenyan state, is a necessity in 
maintaining the rights of refugees and protecting them from the conditions that they were 
fleeing. 
Natural Law Theory will also play a minor role in informing the underlying justifications 
that I think are relevant to the discussion. Refugee rights are human rights and need to be 
respected. Natural Law theory was utilised in the 20th century in the development of human 
rights as universal principles within the international community. The idea of Natural law, 
in its simplest form definition, is viewed as a body of moral principles that is common to 
all humankind and is recognizable by human reason alone.  
Systems theory will also inform the arguments that criticize the Government’s 
maltreatment of refugees. It is the theory that a system should work well, in tandem with 
the legal framework resulting in a system where law, policy and practice align.  
This study is further informed by Positivism. The theory of positivism reinforces the 
authority of a state as defined by the specific rights emanating from the constitutional 
structure. The state though, is also bound by other international bodies. However, this view 
is disputed by the decision-making model in foreign policy theories. State behaviour is also 
influenced largely by the internal actors and internal processes, like individual groups and 
organizations that are all important in determining the behaviour of states. The state needs 
to remain sensitive to internal pressures and internal constraints.  
In this case, while the Kenya government is pre-occupied with issues of national security 
and control of migration flows into the country defined as Kenya’s national interests, the 
handling of these interests impacts other obligations, including its international obligations 
towards refugee protection. Encapsulated in our problem statement is the dilemma faced 
by most states when considering the balance between legitimate state interests and the 
protection of rights and needs of refugees, without doing unnecessary harm to either. 
Despite States’ recognition of the important role played by the 1951 Convention and its 
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1967 Protocol as landmark legal instruments in the setting of standards for the treatment of 
refugees globally, the degree of their implementation remains unsatisfactory.  
From the foregoing theoretical framework, this study points out the minimum standards of 
protection to be guaranteed to refugees as human beings with inherent rights, and further 
highlights the challenges encountered by states in the implementation of state obligations 
towards refugees at both the international and national level. 
 1.8 Limitations and Assumption 
This an academic research aimed at fulfilling the requirements for the conferment of 
master’s in law degree and as thus was limited as to the time and resources committed to 
it. 
It is also assumed from the onset that systematic integration of Somali refugees among 
host communities in Kenya will have a reduction in radicalization and violent extremism. 
This is the author’s bias.  
 1.9 Chapter Breakdown 
This study has five (5) chapters. The first chapter is the introduction. It analyses the 
problem, sets the hypothesis and research questions.  It also provides the literature 
review, the theoretical framework, methodology, limitations and assumptions. The 
proposal for the research will constitute the first chapter of the study. 
The chapter in addition defines key words used in the research so as give the author’s 
understanding of key terms. Such terms will include terms like ‘violent extremism’, 
‘radicalization’ and ‘integration’. 
Chapter two is on the problem of radicalization and violent extremism globally and more 
specifically in Kenya. It will give an insight as to the causes of radicalization in the 
country especially among the Muslim youth and among the refugee population. It will 
further highlight instances where such radicalization has resulted into acts of violent 
extremism. This chapter will address the questions as to (1) what are the factors and 
causes of this scourge (2) the historical development of the phenomena in Kenya and (3) 




The chapter will give a historical context to the extremism and radicalization problem in 
the country. The problem is rooted in the historical injustices against the ethnic Somalis 
and Coastal Muslims and recently coupled with radical Islamic preaching. 
Chapter three will seek to look into Kenya’s counter terrorism measures- mechanisms 
aimed at reducing, preventing and fighting radicalization and violent extremism. The 
chapter will analyze the application of these measures in Somali/Muslim dominated area 
of Eastleigh- it will measure its effectiveness and give conclusions. 
 
The various counter-terrorism tactics, techniques and strategies that will be looked into 
include: review of terrorist related laws, law enforcement, counter-terrorism policy, 
diplomatic efforts and deradicalization programs. 
Chapter four will be used to proving or disproving the hypotheses. It will explore the lack 
of integration as a cause of radical extremism and look into the promise of integration. It 
seeks to analyze whether the successful integration (if adopted as a government policy) of 
Somali refugees into host local communities will result into a reduction of radicalization 
and instances of violent extremism. It will seek to show that if properly and successfully 
integrated, this will result into a reduction in instances of violent extremism in the 
country. 
The final chapter gives the conclusion of the analysis of the research and draws 








RADICALISATION AND VIOLENT EXTREMISM 
 2.1 Introduction 
Chapter one gave the basis on which the paper will take, that is, a look into the local 
integration of Somali refugees and the outcome it will have in reducing terrorism if 
integration is effective. However, before further delving into this the section below will 
look at the meaning and parameters to which the paper will approach integration. After 
which the paper will delve into the historical context of radicalization, factors that lead to 
radicalization and therein conclude. 
 2.2 Social Integration 
Social integration can be understood in three different ways. The first is when social 
integration is looked at as an inclusionary goal that implies equal opportunities and rights 
for all human beings. Secondly, social integration can be viewed in a negative connotation 
of complete uniformity, loss of culture and ‘westernization’. Thirdly, social integration can 
be seen as neither negative nor positive but as an established pattern of human relations in 
any given society.24For the purpose of the objectives of this dissertation the author uses 
social integration to imply the first understanding of equal opportunities for all human 
beings despite religion, nationality and ethnic background. 25 
Therefore, for social integration to be present there has to be: a heightened understanding 
of different cultures and religion to avoid misinterpretation of hatred for certain persons 
based on religion and culture, adequate systems (health, security, immigration, educational, 
employment) that provide equal opportunities to all those who seek their help, adequate 
representation within the government and a positive view within the community of 
immigration and refugees.26 The above factors will be assessed when looking at the causes 
                                                          
24 UNRISD Briefing Paper No.1, Social Integration: Approaches and Issues, World Summit for 
Development, 5, 16. 
25 The mentioned parameters are not the only know differentiating factors but are the most relevant to the 
purpose of this dissertation. 
26 UNRISD Briefing Paper No.1, Social Integration: Approaches and Issues, World Summit for 
Development, 5, 16. It should be noted that within such systems the immigrant is meant to be able to meet 
all their basic needs in all levels including the economic level. This means that the systems in place in a 
government should ensure any immigrant seeking refuge and citizenship is not only able to attain refugee 
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of radicalization to illustrate deficiencies in the above factors can easily result to 
radicalization. The section below will lay down the foundation of radicalization in Kenya 
by giving a historical context.  
 2.3 Historical Context of Radicalization 
The term radicalization has been attributed to terrorism studies and counter-terrorism 
studies since 2004.27 The process of radicalization is a complex interaction of factors that 
do not always result into extreme violence.28 The process can take many different routes, 
including non-violent ones. Therefore, radicals can engage in non-violent actions but still 
have radical ideas on certain issues.29 Therefore, not every radical thinker becomes a 
terrorist, although every terrorist has gone through the radicalization process.30  
Terrorism then becomes the worst possible outcome of the radicalization process. The 
process of radicalization seems to evolve according to the counter terrorism mechanisms 
that countries deploy against radicalization. Before delving into the causes of radicalization 
leading to extreme violence, it is important to look at the historical context of the problem 
of terrorism in Kenya. 
Kenya has been frequently targeted by terrorist and violent extremist since the Al-Qaeda 
1988 bombing of the U.S embassy in Nairobi.31 This attack killed 220 people.32 Since then, 
there have been over 200 violent incidents involving explosives or automatic weapons that 
have been linked to the Al shaabab.33 These attacks have been in government offices, public 
transport, universities, places of worship and shopping malls. The most known attack being 
the Westgate attack which was a four-day siege that left 67 people dead and hundreds 
others injured. The attack occurred on 21 September 2013.34 Two years later on 2 April, 
                                                          
and citizenship but also good living conditions. 
27 Kundnani A, ‘Radicalisation: the journey of a concept’ 54(2) Institute of Race Relations, 2012, 1. 
28 Transnational terrorism, Security and the Rule of Law, Radicalisation, Recruitment and the Counter-
radicalisation Strategy, 5. 
29 Transnational terrorism, Security and the Rule of Law, Radicalisation, Recruitment and the Counter-
radicalisation Strategy, 5. 
30 Transnational terrorism, Security and the Rule of Law, Radicalisation, Recruitment and the Counter-
radicalisation Strategy, 5. 
31 UNDP, Support to prevention of Violent Extremism in Kenya, 1. 
32 UNDP, Support to prevention of Violent Extremism in Kenya, 1. 
33 UNDP, Support to prevention of Violent Extremism in Kenya, 1. 
34 UNDP, Support to prevention of Violent Extremism in Kenya, 1. 
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gunmen, linked to Al shaabab, attacked Garissa University found in Garissa town. This 
attack left 148 students and teachers dead and 80 injured. The most recent attack occurred 
on 15 January 2019, where gunmen stormed the Dusit2 Complex in Nairobi. This 19-hour 
siege claimed the lives of 21 people and left several injured.35  
The impact and cost of such attacks on Kenya’s development agenda is enormous.36 
Consequently, the radicalization and violent extremist phenomena are disproportionately 
impacting youth and women from marginalized areas and communities.37 Al-shaabab and 
other violent extremists have tapped into such regions and used the fragility of the youth 
and women in said marginalized groups to recruit into violent extremism. However, it is 
important to understand that the phenomenon of violent extremism and radicalization is 
not only a Kenyan problem.38 Acts of terrorism have been experienced across the world.39 
According to the top-line statistics of the fourth edition of the Global Terrorism Index, 
generally since 2000 to 2016 the levels of global terrorism as a whole have reduced.40 
However, the report highlights the complex dynamic of how certain countries have 
increased in there level of radicalization and consequently violent extremist acts while 
others have reduced.41 
 Additionally, groups such as Boko Haram and ISIL have increased their activities into 
neighbouring regions such as West Africa and Europe respectively.42 This is despite the 
fact that within their home territory they are being weakened.43 This dynamic illustrates 
the various factors that can lead to terrorism, radicalization and extreme violence at a trans-
national level even though counter-terrorism measures are being deployed.44 To further 
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understand this dynamic the next section will analyse the causes of radicalization leading 
to extreme violence. 
 2.4 Factors that Lead to Radicalization and Extreme Violence 
When analysing the correlation of terrorism there are certain factors that are statistically 
significantly dependent on the level of development of a country. In developing countries 
factors such as marginalization, unemployment, corruption and history of conflict 
influence the level of radicalization and extreme violence.45 Whereas in the Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries, socio-economic factors 
such as youth unemployment, militarization, levels of criminality, access to weapons and 
distrust in the electoral process are the most influential in assessing contributors to 
radicalization.46  
The factors that contribute to radicalization and extreme violence that will be assessed in 
this section work on a few fundamental assumptions. The first assumption is that 
radicalization is seen collectively as a process of socialization that affects individual 
behaviour.47 It implies that radicalization of certain groups can be explained by analysing 
the behaviour of individual members.  
Secondly, there is no single explanation for radicalization.48 The causes of radicalization 
are many and diverse. Therefore, independent factors are insufficient to result in 
radicalization and consequently extreme violence.49 Radicalization is an outcome of 
complex interaction of several factors that vary according to countries. Thirdly, causal 
factors that contribute to radicalization do so in different magnitudes. External factors such 
as political, economic and cultural conditions shape and constrain the individual’s 
environment.50 However, they do not have a direct effect on individual behaviour to the 
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extent to radicalize into extreme violence.51 
 The social and individual level interactions are factors that are able to catalyse other 
external factors to lead to radicalization. This brings in the distinction of causal factors into 
causes that set the foundation for radicalization such as external factors, and catalysts that 
abruptly accelerate the radicalization process.52 The central focus should be how these 
causes and catalyst interact with each other, when combined result in radicalization and 
extreme violence. 
Causal factors of radicalization can be distinguished into two different axes. The first axes 
being a distinction between external, social and individual level.53 These factors differ in 
the extent to which they contribute to radicalization and do not have a direct effect on 
radicalization. However, social and individual factors can intercede this relationship and 
cause direct effect. The second axes focuses on the causes and catalysts that manifest from 
the three levels of external, social and individual level.54 It is evident that the individual 
forms the core of the distinction of axes based on his behaviour that is subjected to a variety 
of causes and different measurement levels. 
External factors can be divided into political, economic and cultural dimensions.55 External 
factors manifest themselves independent of the individual. They have the power to shape 
and constrain the individual’s environment. However, the individual has little to no 
influence on his environment.56 The political climate of a country is an external factor. 
Political events generally occur outside the scope of the individual as their influence is 
minimal on the situation. The same observation can be seen in economic or cultural 
developments such as globalization and industrialization.57 Therefore, external factors do 
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not have a direct effect on individual behaviour. This can be further illustrated by looking 
at the effect of absolute deprivation.58 Poverty acts as an economic problem, hence an 
external factor that absolutely deprives others the right to well-being.59 However, poverty 
does not have a direct effect on radicalization as not all poor people are radicalized. 
Consequently, showing the importance and impact of the social context of an individual in 
the process of radicalization.  
Social factors form the second level and refers to the mechanisms that position the 
individual in relation to relevant others.60 This means the social context is not limited to in- 
groups but also includes out-groups.61 The social factor can be divided into network 
dynamics, relative depravation and identification process.62 The social factor plays an 
intervening role in the relation with external factors and radicalization.  For example the 
use of social media to stigmatize Islam acts as a social factor that will impose a stronger 
radicalization force on Muslims than non-Muslims. Especially if external factors such as 
contravention of basic rights based on Islam already exist.63 
The third level is the individual level. At this level psychological characteristics, personal 
experiences and rationality influence how people respond to their social and external 
environment.64 This means that people radicalize based on their knowledge and attitudes 
towards the political and economic climate coupled with how they respond to major life 
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events.65 Even though individual causal factors occur closest to the individual, it does not 
automatically mean they have the strongest influence on an individual to radicalize into 
extreme violence. 66 
The above factors form the second axes of causes. However, catalysts are also causal 
factors that contribute to radicalization. Catalysts can occur in the three levels of the first 
axes often penetrating through all levels.67 Catalysts accelerate the radicalization process 
but differ from causes in that they do not initiate the process of radicalization but further 
the process. Catalysts are dependent on the individual, as what one discards as irrelevant 
can be a trigger for one person. Therefore, catalysts tend to have an unpredictable and 
volatile nature. Consequently, catalysts are not reasons for radicalization but influencing 
factors for individuals that are already in the process of radicalization.68 The two major 
catalysts are recruitment and triggering events.69 The section below will analyse the general 
causal factors found in external, social and individual level then proceed to analyse the two 
major types of catalysts. 
 2.5 Causal Factors at The External, Social and Individual Level 
  2.5.1 External Factors 
   2.5.1.1 Political causes 
Poor integration is the most prevalent political cause to be attributed to radicalization. In a 
study conducted in 2006 by Twenge, it was showed that individuals tend to become less 
pro-social when they are excluded from group activities.70 Additionally, such people who 
are excluded tend to engage in self-defeating behaviours and have aggressive tendencies.71 
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Hence, people in a society need to be involved and consulted in matters that are pertinent 
in that society for them to feel like they belong in society. This is attributed by the fact that 
the need to belong is one of the primordial wants of the human being and it is only through 
attaining it does one act as a good citizen.72  
However, poor integration of Muslims in Kenya and Western societies is a key issue. Over 
the past decade research has shown that the integration of Muslims in Europe is usually 
half-hearted. Muslims in European countries are generally excluded in policy making 
decisions and from leadership positions.73 This can be seen by the clear underrepresentation 
of the Muslim community in any public institution and organizations.74 This in turn hinders 
the Muslim community from identifying and relating to any European organisation or 
Institution, bringing about a sense of isolation and non-involvement.  
Furthermore, institutional support of Muslims challenging discrimination was found to be 
lacking. Hence, any attempts to involve Muslims in public debates are seen to be insincere. 
Kenya too is plagued with similar facts in the integration of Muslims into the Kenyan 
society as citizens.75 In a study done in 2015, the major factor that increasing the probability 
in youth radicalization in Kenya is the perception of social exclusion and marginalization.76 
This includes lack of participation in key issues that affect the country, under representation 
in government, mistreatment of Muslims based on their religion resulting in contravention 
of basic human rights among other factors.77 
Unchecked and blatant exclusion from group membership can instigate negative and 
aggressive behaviours and attitudes.78 Under certain circumstances, those who have not 
experienced this exclusion to its fullest can identify to the experience and emotions on 
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behalf of their marginalised group.79 Hence, they are motivated to act towards group goals 
to elevate the situation of their in- group they identify with, i.e. the Muslim community. 
This sense of strong identification can make certain members perceive and interpret any 
threat to their group as a personal threat and respond in highly emotional ways. This shows 
that exclusion of a self-relevant group can trigger similar responses as exclusion of the self. 
Consequently, making exclusion of the Muslim society in any country as a foundation for 
radicalisation. 
Additionally, the global perception of Muslims in the world fuels this threat of exclusion. 
This can be attributed to the general feel that Muslims all over the world think the West is 
fighting Islam.80 An opinion poll conducted in 2017 shows that most American Muslims 
and British Muslims feel like the ‘war on terror’ is a ‘war on Islam’.81 This is despite the 
fact that most Muslim communities do not believe nor condone violent extremism done in 
the name of jihad.82  
Conflicts of the West and the Middle East have a high influence on the rate and 
effectiveness of radicalization.83 Especially, when the West picks diplomatic positions that 
are viewed as anti-Islamic. Such views are also placed on any country that is deemed to be 
in support of the West.  In a study done by Usalaam Watch in 2014 showed that due to the 
position Kenya has with European countries, any internal security agencies deployed to 
respond to terrorist attack are not done without further alienating communities whose 
support and cooperation is essential in the fight against terrorism.84  
Additionally, most major attacks in Kenya are ‘revenge’ missions on decisions made by 
other countries that Kenya supports. For example: The first major attack that occurred in 
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Kenya, the bombing of the Norfolk Hotel in December 1980 was attributed to the 1972 
Israeli military raid in Entebbe, Uganda, that was initiated in Kenyan soil.85 The 1998 Al-
Qaida attack on the American Embassy in Nairobi occurred, killing 250 people and injuring 
approximately 5,000 member staff, passers-by and people in neighbouring buildings.86 
This attack was determined as revenge on the U.S for the involvement in the extradition, 
alleged torture and detention of four members of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad who had been 
arrested in Albania.87  
In conclusion, political causes such as non-integration or poor integration of certain groups 
can form the basis for the radicalization process within the afflicted group. However, even 
though a basis is formed, it is not strong enough to be the only cause of radicalization of 
an individual. Other causes help to cement the foundation while others catalyse. The latter 
will be looked at in the section below. 
   2..5.1.2 Economic causes 
The argument on economic causes can be summarised into two types of deprivation, 
relative deprivation and absolute deprivation. When looking at absolute deprivation the 
focus is on poverty.88 Poverty being associated with the lack of means (usually monetary) 
to acquire all the basic needs. However, it is unclear whether absolute poverty is a cause to 
radicalize. This is because the number of people radicalized fall within all social classes. 
A larger percentage falling within middle-class families in contrast to low-income 
families.89 Although on an individual basis, poverty can be a reason to radicalize, in as long 
as it is associated with other factors such as discrimination. On its own it does not stand as 
a cause that lays the foundation for radicalization.90 Consequently, refuting the causal 
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relationship of absolute poverty and radicalization. Thereby, relative deprivation is 
manifested.  
Relative deprivation looks at subjective perception of being unfairly disadvantaged in 
relation to a certain group.91 Hence, a community is not poor because they are ‘lazy’ or 
‘unmotivated’. Rather a community is deemed poor based on systematic discrimination 
that marginalises them and denies opportunities such as employment, education, 
leadership, citizenry based on the identity of such as community, i.e. following the Islamic 
faith.92 Such deprivation can act as a concrete foundation for radicalization. 
   2.5.1.3 Cultural causes 
The stigmatization of Muslim especially in European countries is not directly correlated to 
the Islamic faith but to cultural practices that some Muslim communities have. These 
cultural issues are repression of women, honour killings, and circumcision of young girls. 
However, in some Muslim communities the above issues are also considered Islamic. 
Illustrating the close intertwine of cultural and religion in the Muslim community. 
In this age of globalization and modernisation, social interactions are frequent and easier 
between different cultures and religions. This increases the possibility of inter-ethnic and 
inter-cultural conflicts. Additionally, due to globalisation it is easier to spread ideological 
movements such as radical Jihad to Muslims all around the globe. Hence, globalization can 
encourage the ‘brotherhood of the oppressed’. This spread of an ideology be it the 
‘problems of Islam’ or the ‘radical jihad’ can cause conflict between Islamic communities 
and the West as well as conflict within Muslim communities. Furthering the process of 
radicalization. 
  2.5.2 Social causal factors 
   2.5.2.1 Social identification  
Individual social behaviour is attributed to some extent with identification with social 
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groups. How we behave to a large extent depends on whom we identify with.93 People 
define themselves as individual selves but the group they identify with forms what the 
individual self-constitutes.  This suggests that we feel good about ourselves when the group 
we identify with accepts us.94 An individual can belong to several identity groups based on 
sex, sexuality, ethnicity, profession, religion or a football club. However, among all those 
identities one takes precedence over the others.95 For radicalisation two ambits come into 
play, that is, an identity crisis and security of the group. 
Under identity crisis, it is common for Muslim youths in foreign countries feel alienated 
from the community.96 In the Netherlands, Muslim-Dutch youth feel alienated from their 
parents and the Dutch community. This meeting of two worlds that is the Western and the 
Muslin world cause an identity crisis.97 An identity crisis refers to when an individual 
seems to not fit in into any of the groups they seek to identify with.98 As a way out of this 
isolation, such youth tend to find an identity in the Ummah that binds them with other 
Muslims facing or having gone through a similar plight of identity crisis.99 Whether the 
Muslims are Dutch or Moroccan is irrelevant. 
It is such groups that the second ambit comes into play. The importance of social 
identification is reflected when the group one associates with, such as the Muslim 
community, is threatened.100 The threat is perceived as personal. This threat of their sacred 
in group can result in external aggression to out groups and in-group favouritism. Hence, 
a threat into their religious groups can prompt Muslims to withdraw into a strict in ward 
focused community with impassable borders.101 In such a time of an identity threat all other 
identities become irrelevant such as nationality. Hence, it becomes easier to harm others in 
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the society in as long as they don’t form part of your prevalent identity group and helps 
‘protect’ your in-group from threat. Therefore, Muslims that highly identify with their 
Islamic social group when faced with perceived discrimination based on their faith will 
trigger their most prominent identity to be their religious group and result in aggression 
towards anyone in the out-groups.102 
This applies in Kenya in as much as it applies in Netherlands. When the Muslim community 
is termed as ‘terrorists’ based on their beliefs they will in turn retaliate to the threat of 
stigmatization by radicalizing.103 This form of group identity threat can easily be catalysed 
by actual discrimination especially when it is systematic such as poor integration policies 
among the Muslims within Kenya.104 
   2.5.2.2 Network Dynamics 
Network dynamics revolve around social groups. Radicals, are most influential in the circle 
within which they advocate for their ideas. Therefore, for one to be radicalized they are in 
complex interaction systems that shape and constrain their behaviour. Other people who 
form that part of the interaction system can have more influence on their behaviour than 
they might think, even if they choose to follow them. The mere presence of a charismatic 
leader can have tremendous results on how, when and what rate people radicalize. Coupled 
with the need to belong, youngsters can easily fall into the trap of charismatic leaders who 
seem to ‘understand’ their plight. In this dynamic relationship, it is easy for radical 
individuals to instil their ideas and attitudes in young, receptive Muslims. 105 
Radical ideas are thereby easily transmitted through social groups as social networks 
influence people’s tendencies to radicalize. This can be done through several ways. The 
first avenue is through similarity which breeds connection. This can be explained through 
the theory of homophily, where individuals tend to invest in relationships with people that 
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share their opinions and beliefs. Once within that network, social influence can lead one to 
adopt other attitudes and behaviours that are pertinent in the network.106 
Once such attitudes and beliefs are adopted by the social network they can form prescribed 
norms within the network. This forms the second avenue to which network dynamics can 
enhance the radicalization process. When such norms are realized, anyone in the group 
feels obliged to prescribe to them so that they can fit in. Furthermore, mutual 
encouragement and punishment in network structures encourage conformity and breeds 
over aggressive behaviours. Conformity can lead to encouragement and avoidance of 
punishment and isolation. To some extent individuals can be so close in in their social 
network that they believe whatever they do is right and serves the good of the group even 
when it means harming out groups. This form of conformity is usually associated with 
suicidal terrorism.107 
In conclusion, in social networks radical behaviours, attitudes and beliefs can easily be 
developed and spread through the presence of similarity that breeds connection, well-
developed social norms that are encouraged, charismatic leaders and strong exerting 
influence to conform. Hence, this radical interpretation of Islam that advocates for extreme 
violence and demands for devotion to the in group can exert tremendous pressure and 
willingness to act on behalf of one’s religious ideals. 
  2.5.3 Individual level 
   2.5.3.1 Psychological characteristics 
Psychological characteristics of radicals have not been proven to be significantly different 
from others. Although radicals are conventionally termed as crazy and extraordinary. 
However, this is not supported by research.108 Contrary, most research shows that radicals 
are anything but extraordinary. Consequently, no socio-demographic can fit the group 
termed as ‘radical’ nor a psychological profile.109 
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However, some studies have showed that terrorist behaviours don’t have a psychological 
profile but have a psychological parameter of functioning variables that distinguish radical 
extremist and non-radicals.110 One such influencing factor that has been identified is the 
significance of culture. Some cultures are simply violent, anti-social and aggressive. Such 
cultures tend to heighten the effects of emotional moments such as embarrassment, 
humiliation, isolation and discrimination.111 This makes the radical in said culture to be 
more impulsive and lack self-control. In conclusion, cultures have a large effect on the 
attributes of the radical in that society.  
   2.5.3.2 Personal experiences 
Personal experiences shapes how and what decisions we make. Individual experiences can 
be divided into two categories, these are emotional and cognitive experiences. Cognitive 
refers to people’s knowledge and thoughts on their environment while emotional 
experiences are feelings on the environment.112 
In the cognitive level, what people perceive of their environment is based on what they 
know and what they believe.113 Sometimes this belief maybe detached from actual reality. 
This perception of what they know and believe influences how they respond to causal 
factors at the external and social level. Hence, radical interpretations of religion and its 
purpose can act as a spring board for terrorism but not as a direct cause. This is because 
people are susceptible to radical ideas in as long as their previous experiences have allowed 
for certain vulnerability. Most people would not be found with such vulnerability, to the 
extent to turn them into violent, hate-spreading ideologies. Therefore, following an 
ideology is not a cause of radicalisation but an indicator of the process. 114 
For such vulnerability to occur, a certain level of emotional experiences must have 
occurred. For example, feelings of guilt, shame and desire for revenge are prominent causes 
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of suicide terrorism. According to a 2006 study, Muslims around the world are thought to 
feel humiliated. Such feelings tend to act as vulnerability holes that radical ideologies can 
grow and lead to extreme violence.115 
  2.5.4 Catalysts 
   2.5.4.1 Triggering events 
Trigger events are situational factors that immediately precede the occurrence of terrorism. 
This can be in the form of events that heighten emotions and call for revenge or action. 
Such events can be violence against in-groups, police brutality, contested elections, 
provoking acts by out-groups and compromising speeches by leaders. 116 These events can 
intensify the radicalisation process.  
In the social level, triggering events can lead to group discussions online by networks and 
personal relations which can enhance radical ideologies. Additionally, if the triggering 
event occurs within know networks the effects are catalysing to radicalisation as the 
triggering event touches on treasured in-groups of a social network.117 
Lastly, at the personal level, strategies to cope with major life events can determine whether 
one fully radicalises into violence or stops.118 Those who have faced traumatic experiences 
and have difficulties dealing with such events are most probable to being radicalised based 
on their vulnerability. Also, an individual’s perception of external and social triggering 
events can determine whether they fully radicalize or not. Hence, triggering events at the 
individual level tend to be dynamic and unpredictable. 
   2.5.4.2 Recruitment 
Recruitment acts as an important catalyst for violent extremism that can be found in 
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external, social and individual levels. Recruitment therefore, does not start radical thoughts 
or emotions but accelerate the radicalisation process as a sort of tipping point.119 
In Kenya, mosques are particularly known for facilitating top down recruitment of potential 
radicals.120 Recruitment at the individual level is marked by self-enlistment as a way to 
search for identity as a Muslim in a country that does not fully recognize your identity. 
Additionally, personal in-groups such as childhood friends, makes it easier for recruitment 
and reduces the guilt felt when harm is inflicted because all people in your in-group think 
it’s justified. Thereby, showing the influence of recruitment on the social level.121 
  2.6 Conclusion 
This chapter sought to lay out the various causes of radicalization to show the complex 
dynamic of how the radicalization process starts and is influenced. From the above it is 
clear several factors come into play for one to be fully radicalized. Additionally, not all 
radicals become violent extremists unless most of the above factors integrate. The next 
chapter will focus on the measures that are in place globally and in Kenya to prevent the 
radicalization process and consequently extreme violence. Consequently, this chapter will 
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COUNTER TERRORISM MECHANISMS 
 3.1 Introduction 
The chapter above gave a detailed analysis of the various causes of terrorism in the global 
sphere and highlighted those that are particular to Kenya. In light of this, governments all 
around the world have deployed several mechanisms to help in reducing and preventing 
terrorism in their countries and regions, such mechanisms are known as counter-terrorism 
strategies.122 Therefore, counter terrorism mechanism refer to practices, tactics, techniques 
and strategies used by different governments and its operatives in response to terrorist 
threats.123  
There are various approaches to counter terrorism mechanisms ranging from review of 
terrorism related laws, increasing budgetary allocation to fighting terrorism, training more 
law enforcement on effective ways of dealing with terrorist and developing and 
implementing effective plans. In the global perspective, most countries tend to adopt 
measures to combat terrorism that are based on the Counter terrorism strategy.124 This 
strategy focuses on combined regional and international efforts to reduce terrorism within 
national boundaries. It subsequent review included an analysis of conditions that are 
conducive to the spread off terrorism and methods of addressing such conditions in affected 
nations.125  
This chapter in the sections below will look at the counter terrorism mechanisms that are 
being applied in Kenya such as the use of the National Counter Terrorism Centre; the 
African Union Mission in Somalia; Operation Linda Nchi; Legislative and law 
enforcement efforts; diplomatic efforts; regional, international and collaborative efforts 
and counter radicalization mechanisms. After which the chapter will analyse the 
effectiveness of these mechanisms. Lastly, the chapter will look at the specific mechanisms 
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applied in largely Muslim areas such as Eastleigh and assess their effectiveness in 
Countering Terrorism in Kenya. Therein the chapter will conclude.  
 3.2 Counter Terrorism Mechanisms Used in Kenya 
Kenya from recent events has proved to be highly vulnerable to terrorist attacks, thereby 
urging the government and regulatory bodies to find solutions to the insistent terrorist 
attacks. In 2003 the Kenyan government created the Anti-Terror Police Unit which focused 
on reducing the rate of radicalization of foreign nationals in Kenya and Kenyan nationals 
from migrating into Somalia to join Al-Shabaab.126 This formed the foundation of various 
other counter terrorism mechanisms in Kenya that are discussed below. 
  3.2.1 National Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC) 
After several attacks by the Al-Shabaab militants against and inside Kenya, the Kenyan 
government introduced the National Counter Terrorism Centre. This was after the 
government realized that terrorism in Kenya is a cross-border crime and a national security 
threat.  
The National Terrorism Centre therefore, became a coordination centre which counters the 
violent terrorist activities including the operationalization of the National strategy on 
countering violent extremism and the support for international missions on the war against 
terrorism such as the presence of Kenyan troops in Somalia.127  
The NCTC was formed as a multi-agency mechanism that combined key actors and 
coordinating mechanism with National Counter Terrorism as a focal point. The centre gains 
its mandate from the Kenya Police Strategic Plan that was implemented in 2003, which has 
increased the capacity of the police to cater for internal developments of the police force 
while promoting the welfare of the citizens. These efforts were further boosted by the 2013-
2017 strategic plans that helped improve the operations of the police organ by providing 
better administrative structures, equipment and intelligence collection and distribution 
strategies. Hence, NCTC then becomes a policy institution to serve the coordinating agency 
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for all Counter Terrorism efforts for the Government of Kenya (GoK).128  
The centre has also set up a prevention centres to counter radicalization and violent 
extremism forming part of Kenya’s comprehensive CT strategy which aims at taking a 
softer approach to counter-terrorism from the root of the problem of indoctrination and 
radicalization. 
  3.2.2 National Strategy to Counter Violent Extremism (NSCVE) 
The national strategy to counter violent extremism is the national document that guides 
different stakeholders to counter violent extremism in Kenya. Until September 2016, 
Kenya was guided by its Constitution and other security related laws in responding to 
violent extremism and terrorism. The Kenyan army, for instance has been in Somalia 
fighting radical groups. However, it has been noted that counter terrorism efforts do not 
address the underlying issues that lead to this problem. For example, radicalisation and 
recruitment which are key in propagating violent extremism and terrorism cannot be 
tackled by deploying the army. 
The goal of the Government of Kenya in developing this inclusive National strategy to 
counter violent extremism is rally all sectors of Kenyan social, religious, and economic life 
to emphatically and continuously reject violent extremist ideologies and aims in order to 
shrink the pool of individuals whom terrorist groups can radicalise and recruit.129 
The practical implementation of the NSCVE falls upon the shoulders of the National 
Counter Terrorism Centre, whose intricacies were outlined above. The President gave a 
directive for Counties to develop their own Action Plans that will guide them at the county 
level to address violent extremism. The Action Plans are supposed to contribute to the 
objectives and overall goal of the national strategy and as such are guided in principle by 
it. So far, there are a number of counties that have developed, launched and in the case of 
Mombasa began implementation of these County Action Plans. Kwale, Kilifi, Lamu, Tana 
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River, Isiolo, Garissa and Mombasa are leading in example in implementing this 
directive.130 
To broadly summarise, the document is divided into five sections: 
 Context Rationale and Aims of the Strategy – Examines the radicalist threat and 
details how certain laws have made it more difficult to fight radicalism and violent 
extremism. 
 Radicalisation –This section talks about what drives people into violent 
extremism. Radicalisation could be self or by someone else. The drivers identified 
here are ideological, global, socio-economic, political, personal and technological. 
Radicalisation is a gradual process that takes place in different phases; pre-
radicalisation, self-identification, indoctrination and violent extremism. It is 
through this process that people are recruited into groups where members subscribe 
to similar ideologies. Radicalisation can take place in different spaces; religious 
institutions, online, learning institutions, training camps, prisons and even in 
neighbourhoods. 
 Structuring CVE work – Provides information on how countering violent 
extremism efforts can be crafted. It talks about the nine pillars in which CVE actors 
can organise their work around depending on interest or industry positioned: media 
and online, psychosocial, education, legal and policy, arts and culture, training and 
capacity building, political, faith based and ideological and security pillar. Research 
on CVE, disengagement and integration are also outlined. 
 Stakeholder Entry Point for Effective CVE – Relevant stakeholders are the 
national leadership, private sector, civil society; NGOs and CBOs, Kenya 
Government Ministries, Departments and Agencies, Bilateral and Multilateral 
partners, communities, citizens and elected leaders. Active citizenship in attack 
prevention is also provided for.  
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 Measuring CVE (Counter Violence Extremism) Impact – Has details on why it 
is important to measure and review CVE efforts. This is to ensure that partners are 
on track with the objectives of the strategy, are up to date with emerging trends in 
violent extremism. With the instances of terrorist financing through institutions 
including NGOs, it is important that all efforts to counter violent extremism are 
reviewed and monitored by the National Counter Terrorist Centre. 
An especially important aspect of the NSCVE is the relatively novel aspect of rehabilitation 
of radicals who reject their previous ways of radical life. Prior to the development of the 
NSCVE, measures against violent extremism were security-focused, and were incorporated 
in the following laws: The Prevention of Terrorism Act 2012; the Security Laws 
(Amendment) Act, 2014; and the Proceeds of Crime and Anti-Money Laundering 
(Amendment) Act 2017. These laws focused on addressing violent extremism through 
policing, money laundering controls, intelligence gathering, and prosecution.  
However, the Strategy now complements these security-focused counterterrorism 
measures with a framework for CVE measures, which include the provision of employment 
options, business opportunities and life skills, among other interventions, aimed at reducing 
youth vulnerability to violent extremism.131 This aspect of the policy has however been 
mirrored in other areas of research. One example is the joint effort between Japan and the 
UNDP.132 
A major gap in the NSCVE is it lacks quantitative or qualitative data on the extent and 
nature of the challenge of violent extremism in Kenya, the different actors in CVE work 
and their successes and failures. This data would help to better frame and justify the 
interventions that have been adopted. This is in contrast to the UK Counterterrorism 
Strategy, for instance, which contains comprehensive statistics on causalties, UK citizens 
fighting in terrorist-related conflicts abroad, thwarted terrorist attacks and so on, upon 
which interventions are based.9 This data gap in the NSCVE is however partly addressed 
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by the fact that the Strategy’s roll out prioritizes research and monitoring and evaluation in 
the design and implementation of its interventions.1133 
  3.2.3 African Union Mission in Somalia Initiative (AMISOM) 
The African Union Mission in Somalia is an active regional peacekeeping mission that is 
operated by the AU.134 AMISOM has the mandate to support Somalia’s forces in their 
battle against Al-Shabaab militants. Since 2007 the troops have been able to carry out 
several offensive strategies against Al-Shabaab militants with a troop strength of 22, 126 
since 2015 resulting in the killing of several of the Al-Shabaab leaders.135 In addition, KDF 
and AMISOM troops have been able to evict Al-Shabaab from their stronghold in central 
and southern parts of Somalia such as Mogadishu and Kisumayo. This has had a drastic 
effect in reducing the activities of the Al-Shabaab as the group lost import and export 
revenue due to the capture of the Ports, which formed the main source of income for their 
terrorist activities.136 
  3.2.4 Operation Linda Nchi 
Kenya, had an inter-national coordinated military operation between the Kenyan and 
Somalia militaries in Somalia. This acts as an extension of the AMISON initiatives but on 
a binational rather than regional level. Operation Linda Nchi was an 8 month program that 
started in 16 October 2011 and ended on 31 May 2012.137 The soldiers in this program 
cracked down on Al-Shabaab militants that had been alleged to have kidnapped several 
foreign tourists and aid workers in Kenya. This operation was able to weaken several Al-
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Shabaab operations by capturing and interrogating many Al-Shabaab leaders. 138 
  3.2.5 Focus on Legislation and Law Enforcement 
The focus on legislation came after the Government of Kenya realized that a bulk of 
terrorist activities were being funded within the country. This lead to the Anti-Money 
Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism task force that was able to review 
existing legislation and recommend various ways of formulating effective national policy 
that would shut down existing and prevent emerging channels of financing terrorism.139 
This lead to the GoK to use the Non-Governmental Organisation (NGO) Co-ordination Act 
of 1990 to deregister an array of Muslim NGOs which were accused of having financial 
linkage to terrorist groups. These groups included the World Assembly of Muslim Youth, 
al-Haramain Islamic Foundation, Wakalatul-Rahmah offices, the al-Ibrahim Foundation 
and the al-Najah Islamic Centre.  Additionally, in 2014 the Kenyan NGO Coordination 
Board publicized the registration revocation of 510 NGOs for failing to give requisite 
financial reporting. The board also hinted at a possible inclusion of 15 more NGOS to the 
list on the suspicion of financing terror.140  
This shows that the Kenyan Anti-Money laundering operations have become functional 
over time through the increased monitoring, evaluation and reporting capacities. This is 
largely attributed to deficiencies in the resources that include but are not limited to 
electronic-Financial reporting systems. Furthermore, the Central Bank of Kenya has 
created awareness on the need for citizens to use legal financial sectors in their transactions 
and savings in order to ensure effective and transparent financial flow in financial 
institutions. This has greatly helped in the tracing of illegal transactions that might be 
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linked to terrorism. 
Later on in 2012 the Prevention of Terrorism Act was passed to help the Proceeds of Crime 
and Money Laundering Act of 2011 and the Prevention of Organized Crime Act of 2012 
to run more effectively in countering terrorism.141 In 2014 the Security Laws Act was 
amended to reform twenty existing laws in a bid to enhance the effectiveness of the Counter 
terrorism policy framework.142 This initiated steps to the creation of a coordinated border 
control agency, criminalization of aiding or support for terrorist training and strengthening 
the capacity of the NCTC. However, the reform also allowed for loopholes that lead to the 
infringement of human rights such as the freedom of speech and the rights of refugees.143 
In a bid to make the reform more effective, the GoK, in 2013 divided the Counter Terrorism 
roles between the three arms of the National Police Service which are the Kenya police 
consisting of civil police, the Anti-terrorism Police Unit and the paramilitary General 
Services Unit; the Directorate of Criminal Investigation and the Administration police; and 
the non-policy agencies such as the National Intelligence Service and the KDF.144 
The purpose of this division was to increase the number of personnel that were involved in 
Counter Terrorism strategy, to enhance the effectiveness by dividing duties among the arms 
of National Police Service and increasing the skill set that was available in countering 
terrorism. However, this was not possible as the functioning efficacy of this effort was 
jeopardized due to a lack of intra and inter- police institution coordination as well as 
military coordination. Additionally, the lack of adequate training, resources, politicization 
and corruption made the division unsuccessful and created more confusion.145 
                                                          
141 McKay A, ‘Counterterrorism in Kenya: an interview with Oscar Mwangi’ Oxford Research group, 22 
February 2019-< https://www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/blog/counter-terrorism-in-kenya-an-interview-
with-oscar-mwangi>- on 17 April 2019. 
142McKay A, ‘Counterterrorism in Kenya: an interview with Oscar Mwangi’ Oxford Research group, 22 
February 2019-< https://www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/blog/counter-terrorism-in-kenya-an-interview-
with-oscar-mwangi>- on 17 April 2019. 
143 McKay A, ‘Counterterrorism in Kenya: an interview with Oscar Mwangi’ Oxford Research group, 22 
February 2019-< https://www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/blog/counter-terrorism-in-kenya-an-interview-
with-oscar-mwangi>- on 17 April 2019. 
144 McKay A, ‘Counterterrorism in Kenya: an interview with Oscar Mwangi’ Oxford Research group, 22 
February 2019-< https://www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/blog/counter-terrorism-in-kenya-an-interview-
with-oscar-mwangi>- on 17 April 2019. 
145 Congressional Research service, Countering Terrorism in East Africa: The U. S. Response, 2011, 30. 
35 
 
Although there has been an increase in legislation that tackles counter terrorism, the 
implementation of these law have been hindered by the lack of security capacities and the 
insufficiency of national identification systems that have decreased the rate of success of 
law enforcers’ ability to detect and detain potential terrorists. This eventually necessitated 
the use of biographic, biometric screening and terrorist screening watch lists at the main 
entry ports in the country.146   
  3.2.6 Diplomatic Efforts 
From Chapter two it is clear that the environment around a country can act as a cause of 
terrorism. Kenya, is not free from this as it has unstable neighbours such as Somalia and 
Sudan.147 This has greatly contributed to the rate of terrorist attacks in Kenya. Due to such 
an environment, Kenya has used diplomatic efforts in both Somalia and Sudan as Counter 
Terrorism strategy. This has included talks initiated in Eldoret and in Nairobi that led to 
the recognition and institution of the Transitional Federal Government in Sudan that lead 
to establishing some form of peace in the country.148 
Furthermore, Kenya through IGAD enabled the Sudan peace talks that lead to a 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement in Sudan and South Sudan’s independence. This is 
despite the fact that South Sudan later went into its own war. From the above highlighted 
efforts Kenya deployed a Counter Terrorism strategy of stabilizing neighbouring countries 
such as Sudan, South Sudan and Somalia to make them into peaceful neighbours whose 
security will greatly benefit Kenya.149 
  3.2.7 Regional, International and Collaborative Cooperation 
Kenya is involved in several regional and international conventions. Since 2003, Kenya 
has ratified over thirteen international conventions and protocols, this cumulated into the 
publication of the Suppression of Terrorism Bill. In the regional sphere Kenya is part of 
AU, IGAD, EAC and COMESA as a member and has substantially contributed to the 
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bilateral and multilateral agreements through a substantial troop presence in the affected 
nations. 
Furthermore, Kenya has been in an active role in the development of regional policies that 
boost the effectiveness of Counter Terrorism. This is illustrated through the Peace and 
Security Council meeting organised by the AU, and the regional summits of the EAC 
intelligence and police chiefs. Additionally, Kenya has been an active member in helping 
member states of the AU and EAC to acquire military skills, trainings and drills in their 
military and professional police enforcement so as to enable them to better deal with 
terrorism. 
In the collaborative sphere. Kenya and US have been in a partnership since the 9/11 attacks 
against the Global War on Terror. This partnership involved training, sales of equipment, 
exchange of strategic information and logistical support. Kenyan officers were able to 
participate in many U.S led and sponsored programs that tackled crisis response, 
investigations and prosecution.150 
  3.2.8 Counter Radicalization and Violent Extremism 
In 2014, Kenya made the pivotal step of partnering with NGOs such as the CSOs civil 
society to help counter terrorism through the 2014 National Conference on Security and 
CVE. During this conference state and non-state actors were actively engaged in 
formulating and adopting the Violent Extremism Advocacy and Accountability Charter. 
This helped to formulate a concise National Counter Radicalization Strategy which tasked 
religious leaders on their significant role in the community to reduce the risk of 
radicalization and further violent extremism through influencing peace and reducing 
tension within their communities.151 
The above form the Counter Terrorism approaches that have been applied in a national 
level. The section below will take a particular look into the specific approaches that are 
used in Muslim populated areas with our case study being Eastleigh. This section will seek 
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to analyse how effective the Counter Terrorism mechanisms in Eastleigh are and if they 
promote peace or further ostracize the Muslim community. 
 3.3 Counter Terrorism Strategies In Muslim Populated Areas: Case Study Of 
Eastleigh Location 
In 2014, the Global Terrorism Index ranked Kenya as the twelfth in the highest ranking 
countries that are affected by terrorism. The study found out that it is necessary for the 
GoK to tackle the underlying problems to terrorism that have greatly been increased by the 
refugee inflow who have migrated and settled into urban areas. Eastleigh is predominantly 
recognized as more of a profit making business centre with a wide range of retailers and 
wholesalers than a residential area.152 
Eastleigh was established and referred to as a ‘Little Mogadishu’ owning to the fact that it 
had a high resident rate of refugees in the region who are of largely Somali origin. Eastleigh 
has over 350,000 inhabitants who mostly include Somali Kenyans as well as registered 
Somali refugees.153 However, Eastleigh despite being the hub of trade networks locally and 
internationally is faced by frequent state security arrest and identification of illegal 
migrants.  
This can be partly attributed by the fact that the area has experienced numerous terrorist 
attacks with the climax being in 2012 that had a recorded more than 6 attacks. Therefore, 
Eastleigh became a primary concern in regards to Counter Terrorism efforts in Kenya. In 
response to the rise of terror attacks since 2012 to present date, most residents in Eastleigh 
have noted an increase in police squads and units heavily geared to prevent terrorism from 
happening and location and detaining culprit with ease. 154 
The parties that have been part of the beefed up police squad are the Anti-Terrorism Police 
Unit, National Counter Terrorism Centre, National Security Intelligence Service and 
National Security Advisory Committee.155 Due to the insistent attacks in the Eastleigh 
region several other Counter Terrorism mechanisms have been deployed in the area. This 
                                                          
152 This turn form residential to business centre took place in the 1990s.  
153 UNHCR, Kenya: Somali Refugees, UNHCR Factsheet, 2014. 
154 UNHCR, Kenya: Somali Refugees, UNHCR Factsheet, 2014. 
155 UNHCR, Kenya: Somali Refugees, UNHCR Factsheet, 2014. 
38 
 
strategies are highlighted below: 
  3.3.1 Risk Reduction Strategies 
Risk reduction is a process that involves the identification, assessment and mitigation of 
risks of a calamity.156 The main aim of risk reduction is to minimize the social-economic 
exposures and approach to deal with occurring hazards that are mainly environmental. 
According to Murty, there exists four main risk factors that are explosions, armed attacks, 
and arson, biological and nuclear attacks. However there exists a fifth category of others 
that deals with cyber terrorism, terrorism and unauthorized surveillance. These factors act 
as a potential source of harm if not properly tackled and anticipated. The effects of said 
factors have been experienced in Kenya during numerous occasions such as the 1998 U.S 
Embassy bomb attack. 
The risk reduction strategies that have been used in Eastleigh are metal detectors, 
automation of services, electronic detection systems, checks and searches in interest area, 
barring of major roads and managing random security checks in public. However, these 
risk reduction strategies are only good in paper as their enforcement is constantly hindered 
by the numerous challenges that are faced in its implementation.157 Most of the challenges 
that the risk reduction strategy faces are; inadequate policy and legal framework for the 
implementation of risk reduction strategies, weak to non-existent disaster management 
capabilities within the police, organization and the communities, inadequate co-ordination 
and integration among the ministries and inadequate regional linkages. These 
insufficiencies led to the risk reduction strategy being ineffective and furthermore being 
seen as a geared attack towards Somali refugees in Kenya due to the human rights 
violations that occurred during risk reduction strategies such as the rights of an arrested 
person and the rights of refugees.158 
This can be illustrated by the fact that most residents in Eastleigh find that putting risk 
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measures could be a simple exercise of stationing police checks and restricting entry under 
reasonable grounds. However, most incidents have been quoted to include violence and out 
right discrimination towards the Muslim population in Eastleigh.159 
  3.3.2 Security Operations 
Security operations is a Counter Terrorism strategy that aims at identifying and removing 
individuals who are found in the country illegally.160 Most of those who are affected by 
such as operation are mainly Somalis who have been ethnically profiled. 161 
Security Operations in Eastleigh have mainly been through the Operation Usalama Watch 
which was launched in April 2014 with a personnel of over 6,000 police officers and 
Soldiers who were deployed in Eastleigh.162 The goal of the Usalama Watch was to remove 
the foreign nationals as a Counter Terrorism strategy. The security operation therefore deal 
with and deported all immigrants who were suspected to engage in illegal activities. The 
strategy was successful in apprehending many illegal immigrants who were located in 
Eastleigh. Most of which were detained and taken to refugee camps.163  
Although the operations were well intended, most of the activities of the Usalama Watch 
were met with criticism. This is because the measures taken were deemed to be excessive 
and biased towards Somali people. This is largely because the operations do not solve the 
root of the problem that is why most immigrants would choose to stay as illegal immigrants 
instead of applying for citizenship. The answer to which is the tiresome and discriminatory 
nature of the process for applying for citizenship form Somali refugees in Kenya.164 
This then forces most refugees to find a means of living as illegal immigrants, to which not 
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many options are offered leading to an inclination to criminal activities. Michelle Kigali of 
the Amnesty International has then rightly termed the Operation Usalama Watch as a 
pretext for the blanket punishment of the Somali Community in Kenya.165 There have been 
scapegoats with thousands arrested and ill-treated, forcefully relocated and hundreds 
unlawfully expelled to a war-torn country. This therefore, calls for the police in charge of 
the Operation Usalama Watch to be more vigilant with conducting their operations to 
ensure no discrimination occurs.166 
  3.3.4 Community Policing 
Community Policing is a change of strategy that involves the community in ensuring that 
the environment they reside in is safe. This approach differs from the traditional Counter 
Terrorism mechanisms as it requires the police to work hand in hand with the community 
to ensure peace, thereby sharing mandates and powers within both spheres of the police 
and the community.167  
The community based approach arose as a Counter Terrorism mechanism due to the rapid 
change in crime conditions that ended up rendering most policing attempts futile. 
Furthermore, the deteriorating trust in the police force by the communities required 
community involvement to ensure accountability.168 Hence, the security organs are able to 
get a localised response to prevalent issue thereby increasing police efficiency and 
accountability. Additionally, existing problems to the pre-existing challenges are easily 
identified and solved.169 
The community based strategy three key factors ought to be implemented for it to function 
effectively. These three are; community partnership, change management and problem 
                                                          
165 O Kefa, ‘Kenya in the crosshairs of global terrorism: Fighting terrorism at the periphery’ 3(1) Kenya 
Studies review, 2009, 110. 
166 O Kefa, ‘Kenya in the crosshairs of global terrorism: Fighting terrorism at the periphery’ 3(1) Kenya 
Studies review, 2009, 110. 
167 Henderson J and Merrick C, ‘Community: policing: Variations on the western model in the developing 
world’ 4(3) Police Practice and Research, 2003, 281. 
168 Henderson J and Merrick C, ‘Community: policing: Variations on the western model in the developing 
world’ 4(3) Police Practice and Research, 2003, 282. 
169 Henderson J and Merrick C, ‘Community: policing: Variations on the western model in the developing 
world’ 4(3) Police Practice and Research, 2003, 282. 
41 
 
solving.170 Therefore for the community policing to be effective, public seminars and rallies 
should be conducted so as to educate citizens concerning the role of the police and the role 
of the community by giving avenues to which the community can be involved. This will 
foster a strong community and police partnership as each of their roles are fully discussed 
and understood. This enables a sense of collective responsibility through community 
cooperation and community consent.171 
In Kenya, community policing was initiated in 2003 and is still ongoing. The Kenya Police 
Annual Report stated that the community policing was to combine the efforts and resources 
of the government agencies and the community members so as to bridge the gap between 
the government agencies and the community members.172 This eventually led to the 
Nyumba Kumi initiative as a community policing initiative. The initiative was 
implemented as a way to engage the community more in preventing and curbing terrorism 
in the area. 173 
The strategy has been largely successful but is plagued by several challenges. For example 
the community policing approach is viewed by many as a tool used by the government to 
minimize crime and terrorist attacks instead of an agent. This implies that the community 
acts as a source of information but the police do not reciprocate the same information 
sharing.174 This is attributed to the fact that the community within the Nyumba Kumi 
initiative as meant to provide information to the police and on this reliance the police act. 
However, the police do not provide any information themselves. This can be seen as unfair 
and discourage most members of the community from participating in the community 
policing initiative. Additionally, the community policing system can only work with a 
small number of people due to the limited resources and funding to further expand the 
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Community Policing programs.175 
  3.3.5 Random Searches 
The police unit assigned to Eastleigh usually subject the residents to random searches. 
These searches range from premises of the detainees, their documents, bank records, 
photographs and other items that are seized at the time of the search. The periodic screening 
occurs due to the perception that Somali residents in Eastleigh are perceived to have wealth 
which is deemed to come from illegal activities or sources.  
However, the police have been reported to use this as an opportunity to extort and arrest 
residents.176 This is illustrated by the fact that these usual searches are done without search 
warrants or any proper procedure used when a search warrant is not present. This is despite 
the fact that Kenyan law requires the issuance and presentation of a search warrant during 
searches and seizures.  
 3.4 Effectiveness of the Counter Terroism Strategies 
Effectiveness is determined by how well strategies are adopted and implemented to meet 
the intended goal. For effectiveness to occur proper communication, interpretation, 
adoption and actions of the strategies must occur.177 At Eastleigh several attempts have 
been made by the GoK to counter terrorism as highlighted in the above sections. Additional 
efforts such as training and employing the police personnel, and formation of special 
agencies has aided in the implementation of the Counter Terrorism mechanisms.  In terms 
of the intelligent services, most attacks have been detected and stopped before occurring in 
Eastleigh. This is due to the heightened security measures that have been put in place such 
as deploying more personnel in interest areas in the region. Emergency drills are also 
conducted within Eastleigh to ensure preparedness of the community in the event of an 
attack.178 
However, the counter terrorism mechanisms have not been fully efficient on how they are 
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implemented. Some residents in the area have indicated that only Muslims and Somalis are 
unfairly targeted in comparison to other groups of people. Hence the root causes of terror 
within the region are not fully tackled such as radicalization, unemployment and poverty 
due to lack of proper integration of the Somali refugee community in Kenya. Additionally, 
police officers are known to ask for bribes hence making their targets the most well of in 
the region instead of those who are highly suspected to be terrorists.179  
 3.5 Conclusion 
The finding of this chapter show that the Kenyan Counter Terrorism strategies 
implemented between 2003 and 2019 have been grossly insufficient and ineffective. This 
is evident by the insistent small and large scale attacks that have occurred in Kenya within 
that time frame. Additionally, the strategies deployed have been plagued with corruption, 
lack of resources, organizational inefficiency, technical capacity, poor interagency law 
enforcement coordination, insufficient training and politicization of some terrorist 
incidents that have reduced the effectiveness of the Counter Terrorism mechanisms used. 
Furthermore, from a keen look of the Counter Terrorism strategies it is clear that most 
strategies take a state-centric and militarized angle to solving the issue of terrorism. Which 
as mentioned in chapter two is not the ideal means to deal with terrorism in the preventive 
stage. This is because the factors that facilitate terrorism in Kenya are not properly dealt 
with, the biggest cause being non-integration and alienation of the Muslim Somali refugees 
in Kenya. A deeper look into the main cause of terrorism in Kenya will allow the GoK to 
formulate long lasting humane strategies that prevent terrorism rather than focusing on 
controlling terrorism. The next chapter will analyse whether Somali refugees in Kenya are 
properly integrated. Upon which the chapter will analyse the connection between effective 
integration and reduction in instances of radicalization leading to violent extremism. 
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PROVING AND DISPROVING HYPOTHESES: EXPLORING LACK 
OF INTEGRATION AS A CAUSE OF RADICAL EXTREMISM AND 
THE PROMISE OF INTEGRATION 
 4.1 Introduction 
The core function of this chapter is to prove or disprove the hypotheses outlined in Chapter 
Three, through research questions. This chapter will first look at the validity of the claims 
that Somali refugees are involved in violent extremist activity. Focus will be on the 
respondents of this study. Special focus will be on the urban Somali population in 
Eastleigh, though the rural populations will be considered as well. Once the level of refugee 
participation is established, an outline and analysis of the legal mechanisms available to 
the Kenyan Government to counter violent extremism by said refugees will be given. 
Thereafter, the possibility or impossibility of integration being a factor in reducing violent 
extremism will be investigated. It is at this point that the arguments will become more local 
and suited to the subjects of this study, i.e. the urban Somali refugees in Kenya. This 
possibility or lack of it will first be investigated by assessing the level of local integration 
of Somali refugees. Only then will the reasons behind the lack of integration be questioned 
and answered. An in depth investigate the causes of radicalisation has already been given 
in Chapter Two and thus will not be repeated. 
Using information on integration as a factor in violent extremism, an attempt at a Kenyan 
solution to violent extremism will be investigated. This will be through an analysis of 
whether the local Somali refugee population’s participation in violent extremist activity 
can be curbed through successful local integration. 
Thereafter, the chapter will seek to explore whether the successful integration of Somali 
refugees into host local communities will result in a reduction of radicalization and 
associated instances of violent extremism. The study will seek to show that if properly and 
successfully integrated, this will result in a reduction in instances of violent extremism in 
Kenya. 
This chapter will investigate local integration as a concept. This concept will be analysed 
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from the point of whether it is a factor in mitigating violent extremism. It will seek to 
understand how the process works and has been implemented in other countries that have 
adopted it. 
 4.2 What is the legal framework surrounding the handling of refugees, and is it 
sufficient? 
The chapter will commence by analysing the Kenyan case of Kituo Cha Sheria & Others 
vs. The Attorney General180 that tackled the issue of the purported repatriation of refugees 
back to Somalia by the Kenya government. Kituo Cha Sheria a legal aid and advocacy non-
governmental organization filed the case at the Kenyan High Court: 
Kituo cha Sheria founded its cause on the basis that the State violated Article 47 of the 
Constitution which enjoins the State to take administrative action that is, “expeditious, 
efficient, lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair.”181 It averred that Government Directive 
to move all refugees in urban areas to refugee camps violates various provisions of the 
Constitution. Among them was Article 28 which protects the right to dignity. This is human 
dignity, in accordance with Natural Law sentiments that all human beings share the same 
dignity by virtue of being human. Another right claimed to be violated is Article 39 which 
protects the right to movement. This right to movement should not be confused with the 
right to settle that is only available to citizens. The right to movement extends to refugees 
as well, including other law-abiding inhabitants. Another claimed violation was one 
contrary to Article 27 which prohibits arbitrary and discriminatory actions, which have no 
justification in law. 
The Government directive referred to in this case is the one mandating the return of Somali 
refugees to camps, even allowing the use of force to do so that will be mentioned below. It 
is important to note that the Bill of Rights applies to all persons within Kenyan borders. In 
its interpretation of strict wording, that includes people who got into the country by 
unknown means. The government annexed in its submissions to the court case law where 
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Somali refugees were found to be engaging in extremist radical activity.182 
The treatment of refugees in Kenya as per their classification as vulnerable persons, e.g. in 
the Kituo cha Sheria case was contrary to the required legal standard.183 It was documented, 
submitted and accepted that some of the petitioners were brutally confined against their 
will. This included children, who are even more protected persons as will be shown later. 
As per the legal standard, vulnerable persons are those who are in danger from forces they 
need protection from. The party required to provide this protection is the state. Refugees 
are a special category of persons who are, by virtue of their situation, considered 
vulnerable. The legal basis of this assertion is Article 21.184 
Article 21(3) imposes specific obligations on the State in relation to vulnerable persons. It 
provides that, “All State organs and all public officers have the duty to address the needs 
of vulnerable groups within society, including women, older members of society, persons 
with disabilities, children, youth, members of minority or marginalised communities, and 
members of particular ethnic, religious or cultural communities.” 
An interesting scenario arises concerning the status of refugees. Section 3 of the Refugees 
Act (2006) provides for the classification of refugees by their status. Prima farcie refugees 
are those who simply find themselves in the country. This class of refugee is recognised 
only to enable registration of them, with no other apparent purpose than to accord a lower 
legal status. Section 11 of the same Act mandates that all prima facie refugees be registered. 
This seems to imply that person does not automatically become a refugee with all refugee 
rights upon entry into Kenya. He or she must apply for registration to be recognised as 
such. Specifically, section 11(1) of the Act states that any person who has entered Kenya 
by any means must register as a refugee.185 The wording of this section seems to suggest 
that those who do not comply with it either do not wish to stay in Kenya or are not allowed 
to Stay in Kenya. 
There are local and international instruments that crush the logic of the statement that some 
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refugees could leave against their will. Among the international instruments are: 
a. The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (“1951 Convention”) 
b. The 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees 
c. The 1969 Organisation of African Unity Convention 186. This has been updated to 
the modern day as Article 2(3) of the AU Convention. 
d. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
e. The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
f. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
g. The African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (“The African Charter”).  
 
A recognised refugee (meaning one who has been recognised by the Act through 
registration) has a range of rights. Section 16 of the Refugees Act, 2006 provides that every 
recognised refugee and every member of his family living in Kenya shall be entitled to the 
rights and be subject to the obligations contained in the international conventions to which 
Kenya is party. Additionally, they shall be subject to all the laws in force in Kenya.  
Under section 14 of the Act, every refugee shall be issued with a refugee identity card or 
pass in the prescribed form and is permitted to remain in Kenya in accordance with the 
provisions of the Act. Section 15 extends these rights to members of the family of a refugee. 
Refugees are also entitled to the protections of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights.187 
The above two paragraphs are all fitting and I have no scrutiny to extend upon them in their 
explicit meaning. However, their implicit meaning harbours a sort of loophole that can be 
exploited by the Government. The Act states that only recognised refuges are accorded the 
rights mentioned above. This seems to suggest that unrecognised refugees are not protected 
by the Act. This may lead to some problems as will be shown later on especially regarding 
urban refugees. It is no surprise that the respondents of the study claimed a denial of a 
refugee identity card. These same refugees were denied registration due to the State’s 2014 
encampment policy. 
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Regarding whether the urban population of refugees get to enjoy the freedom of movement 
that they have, the courts gave a decisive opinion. That Article 39 of the Constitution ought 
be read together with Article 26 of the 1951 Refugee Convention. This is in order to give 
effect the rights of refugees. As a boost, Article 26 provides thus; “Each contracting State 
shall accord to refugees lawfully in its territory the right to choose their place of residence 
and to move freely within its territory subject to any regulations applicable to aliens 
generally in the same circumstances.”188 This provision is manifested in section 16 of the 
Act and is not inconsistent with the Article 39 of the Constitution. Article 12 of the African 
charter expresses that every individual shall have the right to freedom of movement and 
residence within the borders of a State provided he abides by the law. 
As far as refugees are concerned, two conclusions may be drawn from Article 39. First, 
although the right under Article 39(3) is limited to citizens, it does not expressly limit the 
right of refugees to move within Kenya guaranteed under Article 39(1).189  The only 
omission is settlement, i.e. permanent residence. This is a requirement for integration of 
refugees. Thus, it can be said that the Constitution denies integration based on this 
distinction. This would only be a partial assumption because there are no Constitutional 
prohibitions either.  
Regarding applicability of the Bill of Rights,  Article 19(3)(b) of the Constitution states 
that, “The rights and fundamental freedoms in the Bill of Rights – (b) do not exclude other 
rights and fundamental freedom not in the Bill of Rights, but recognised or conferred by 
law, except to the extent that they are inconsistent with this Chapter.” It follows that any 
limitations to these rights cannot be arbitrary and must comply with the legal standards. 
The standard to be adhered to is found in Article 24, as will be demonstrated. 
Section 17 of the Act is merely facilitative in the sense that it sets out the responsibilities 
of a refugee camp officer to register refugees. There is no outright refusal to deny refugees 
their rights as per the Constitution.  The 2006 Refugee Act does not require that all refugees 
and asylum seekers to ordinarily reside in camps nor does it preclude the State from 
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providing refugee services in urban centres. The courts held that the failure to provide such 
services in urban centres was a threat to their right to movement enshrined in Article 26 of 
the 1951 Convention as read with section 16 of the Act. Additionally, it seems that the 
Government directive of encampment had no legal basis within the Refugee Act. The court 
in the 2013 Kituo cha Sheria held as much in its judgement.190 
In the judgement of the Kituo cha Sheria case, the court gave direction on to what extent 
article 24 can be used as a defence of rights abuses by the state. It came out that in such 
instances the threat to national security by individuals has to be proven. Group guilt cannot 
be assumed, as was and sometimes is the case. The relief granted in the landmark Kituo 
cha Sheria case guaranteed as much. The decision was that arbitrary application of Article 
24 violates the State’s responsibility towards persons in vulnerable situations contrary to 
Article 21(3). 
Kenya hosts a large refugee population, which is managed jointly by the country’s 
Department of Refugee Affairs (DRA) and the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR) under the 2006 Refugees Act and the 2009 Refugees 
Regulations191.  Kenya recognizes two classes of refugees: prima facie refugees and 
statutory refugees.  All asylum seekers go through an initial registration.  At this point in 
the process, they are screened for their eligibility to seek asylum and to obtain accelerated 
processing.  This is followed by an interview. 
 
An asylum seeker is issued an asylum-seeker pass upon applying for refugee status, which 
is replaced by a refugee identification card after his application is granted.  All asylum 
seekers and refugees are required to live in their designated refugee camps and need a 
movement pass in order to travel anywhere outside the camp. These rules do not apply to 
refugees based in urban centres. 
 
Before 2011, Kenya allowed refugees and asylum seekers to live in urban areas, a policy 
that received official endorsement when. In 2011, the government began registering 
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refugees in urban centres and issuing them refugee certificates. By 2012, there were an 
estimated 100,000 refugees living in Nairobi, over three times the officially registered 
refugees in the city in 2006. Following a series of terrorist attacks in urban locations, the 
DRA announced an encampment policy at the end of 2012, requiring all refugees and 
asylum seekers in cities to relocate to refugee camps with the plan to repatriate them to 
their home countries. In a ruling issued in July 2013, the Court held that the government 
announcement was, among other things, a violation of the constitutional right of movement 
and the principle of non-refoulement enshrined in the Refugees Act. 
 
The right protected in Article 39 of the Constitution makes a distinction between person 
and citizen.192 Freedom of movement under the Constitution relates to everyone, but the 
right to enter, remain and reside anywhere in Kenya is accorded only to citizens hence the 
State may impose reasonable condition upon the right to enter, remain in and reside 
anywhere in Kenya upon non-citizens.  
A cursory glance at both practice and policy since December 2006 however reveals that 
the enactment of the Act has neither improved nor changed the refugee response in Kenya 
and refugees and asylum seekers continue to be subjected and regarded as aliens under the 
Aliens Restrictions Act and Immigration Act, hence far from enjoying their internationally 
recognised rights193 
There appear to be fundamental flaws in the legal framework and implementation 
surrounding the treatment of refugees. Refugees as registered by the government in 
accordance with the refugee act are subject to discrimination, against the constitution and 
international law as will be shown below. It has been shown that this classification of 
refugees exacerbates the problem. Based on the analysis of the integrated portion of the 
Somali community, it is reasonable to assume that a change in the legal framework 
surrounding refugee classification may be a solution. That integration would help solve the 
problem of radicalisation has already been proven.  
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The Refugee Advisory Committee tasked with advising and assisting the Commissioner of 
refugees on matters related to recognition of refugees is yet to be constituted. The required 
legal framework is clearly incomplete. 
 4.3 Is there a disconnect in how the state enforces the required standard of law 
towards refugees? 
In the realm of unofficial crackdowns, the rights of refugees have been trampled upon 
especially the right to dignity. This right to dignity is especially underpinned by one 
international human rights instrument: The UDHR which states; “Whereas recognition of 
the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human 
family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world.”194 This is an ample 
example of Natural Law theory. 
I am of the opinion that the state has previously hid behind human rights abuses through 
the use of the national security argument. It is correct to state that the rights enjoyed by the 
refugees under the 1951 Convention are not absolute and they are expected to abide by the 
national law. The rights also go with responsibilities such as abiding by national legislation. 
Article 33(2) of the 1951 Convention states convicted persons or those who commit crimes 
are not entitled to refugee protections.195  Sections 4 and 16 of the Refugee Act mirror such 
sentiments, citing dangers to the country as not deserving of the title ‘refugee’.196 
Any assertions that the state is always in compliance with the directive to register refugees 
would be naïve in the extreme. It has been proven, even in a court of law that there are 
instances where services have been denied to urban refugees (e.g. in the kituo cha sheria 
case, among others).  
There are instances where the Government cannot arbitrarily blanket all refugees as threats 
to national security. The learned Justice in both Kituo cha Sheria cases held that a policy 
that does not make provision for examination of individual circumstances and anticipated 
exceptions is unreasonable and a breach of Article 47(1).197 This article allows for the 
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examination of different individual circumstances.  
Documentation of denial of the Government to issued registration and service delivery does 
exist. Evidence to the tune that the 5th petitioner in the Kituo Cha Sheria case had applied 
for renewal of his refugee identity card was admitted.198 It was held that the State had not 
taken any steps to facilitate the renewal of his identity card by providing registration centres 
within urban areas. In fact, the affirmative policy of the government then and now was to 
close such registration centres in urban areas in order to force urban refugees into camps.  
Such a policy undermines the protections and the rights of refugees living in urban areas 
by surreptitiously imposing a policy of encampment thus denying them an opportunity to 
renew identity papers. It is interesting to note that there are no legal arguments that back 
such a position. The right to movement is even manifested in Section 16 and is not 
inconsistent with the Article 39.199 
Although refugees have been allowed to engage in informal employment in the past as will 
be shown, this appears to be getting increasingly difficult as the encampment policy 
constrains their ability to move about the country.  In addition, work permits are rarely 
issued to refugees. This was again confirmed by over four fifths of the interviewed 
respondents.   
 
Similarly, while refugees are technically free to apply for naturalization if they meet certain 
requirements, which on their face are not prohibitive, in practice Kenya does not naturalize 
refugees. All the respondents who knew of those who had tried to obtain citizenship 
complained of requests for bribes, and sometimes outright refusal to register refugees. 
Under the mention of the Citizenship Act, it will become clearer why this position is held. 
 
In December 2014, Kenya took the matter further and made key amendments to the 
Refugees Act of 2006.  A provision in the 2014 amendment sought to make permanent the 
encampment policy. Another provision states that every refugee and asylum seeker will 
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leave the designated refugee camp only with the permission of the Refugee Camp 
Officer.200 Once again, this only applies to those in camps at the time of the amendment. 
There should be no reason to force urban based refugees into camps. 
  
The most drastic provision in the 2014 amendment was one that sought to dramatically 
reduce the number of refugees and asylum seekers in the country, potentially through 
forced repatriation.  It states that number of refugees and asylum seekers permitted to stay 
in Kenya shall not exceed one hundred and fifty thousand persons.201 This is a prime 
example of knee-jerk reaction litigation. The strict implementation of this law today would 
result in the refoulment of 400,000 refugees and asylum seekers, most of whom are Somali 
citizens. 
While refugees may theoretically work, the practice is reportedly much different.  The 
Refugee Consortium of Kenya stated in 2012 that the government does not issue work 
permits to asylum seekers or refugees except in a few isolated cases.202 As a result, refugees 
and asylum seekers are forced to seek employment in the informal sector. However, this is 
increasingly being made difficult by the country’s encampment policy, which restricts the 
ability of refugees and asylum seekers to move about the country freely. Clear evidence of 
policy contrary to law. 
 
Among the decisions was the directive that all refugees residing outside designated refugee 
camps as specified in Gazette Notice No.1927 of 2014 must return to their designated 
camps immediately.203  
The state had also failed to apply the “best interests of the child” standard in terms 
of Article 53(2) in the implementation of the directive and press statement.204  That this 
standard is repeated in Section 4(2) of the Children Act, which provides that in all actions 
concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare institutions, 
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courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best interest of the child 
shall be a primary consideration.205 
Furthermore, that upon registration in urban centres, refugees are issued 
with UNHCR mandate certificates which were still valid at the time that “Operation 
Usalama Watch” was conducted. These certificates no longer appear to be valid.206 
Interviews with the respondents confirm this, where the 20% who have at some point been 
arrested say that such documents did not help them. 
A path to naturalization is apparently available to refugees.  As shown above, the 
Constitution provides that a person who has been lawfully resident in Kenya for a 
continuous period of at least seven years and who meets other conditions prescribed in the 
relevant legislation may be naturalized.  Kenyan law on citizenship provides additional 
conditions, including the ability to speak Kiswahili or a local language and the capacity to 
make a substantive contribution to Kenya’s development. How can one prove substantive 
contribution when they are denied work permits? How can one prove that they have been 
in the country for seven years if they were denied registration and renewal of official 
refugee documents? This is probably why in practice; Kenya does not appear to grant 
citizenship to refugees in practice. 
 4.4 Are Somali Refugees Involved in Radical Extremism? 
Violent extremist activity has escalated in frequency in Kenya.207 It is important to note 
that Kenya has a long history of terrorist activity.208 Therefore, the assumption that the 
problem (of radical extremism) begins and ends with Somali refugees would not be an 
accurate one to make. This is because even before Somali refugees entered en masse into 
the country there were still instances of radical extremism. Some reports such as one by 
Amnesty International claim that Somali refugees are being used as a scapegoat in Kenya 
for radical extremism. 209 This is one portion of the narrative, which suggests minimal 
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participation by Somali refugees. 
However, there is a case to be made for the recent involvement of local Somali refugees in 
the planning and execution of radical extremist activity. The office of the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees (UN) has observed that instances of violent extremist 
activity have increased in Kenya since its military expedition into Somalia.210  
There has also been a shift in the claimed culprits from organisations with ties in the Middle 
East (e.g. Al-Qaeda) to those with headquarters closer to home, specifically Al Shabab.211 
These statements imply that the executors of terror attacks have shifted from non-Somali 
to Somali persons. This is another portion of the narrative that suggests overwhelming 
participation on the part of Somali refugees. Meaning the radical extremism increases as 
more Somali refugees enter the country. 
The above-mentioned portions of the narrative constitute a relatively black and white 
approach to answering the question. What the author finds to reflect the reality on the 
ground is an amalgamation of both points of view. This is a position shared by the Kenyan 
state. The Kenyan Government has alleged that Somali refugees have directly and 
indirectly participated in radical extremist activity.212 Direct participation would constitute 
planning and execution of radical extremist activity. Indirect participation would be 
sympathizing with the cause and sheltering known radical extremists. 
The general arguments given above provide little in the way of specific examples of Somali 
refugees engaging in radical extremism. There is no evidence to back reports that every 
single Somali refugee is a violent extremist. The four attackers in the Westgate Attack of 
September 2014 were Somalis, who are believed to have lived in Kenya for some time, two 
of who are claimed to have had illegally acquired Kenyan national identification papers 
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and citizenship documents by the authorities.213 Thus, they could have only been refugees, 
not members of the local population. 
The April 2015 Garissa University College attack was the second deadliest terrorist attack 
in the country since the 1998 US Embassy attack, claiming the lives of 142 college 
students. It is implied that Somali refugees may have been involved.214 The refugees 
mentioned primarily resided in two major locations. Frist is in the camps named Dadaab 
and Kakuma, and second is in urban areas such as Nairobi.215  
If indeed Somali refugees are involved (and they are), where are they being recruited from? 
In Kenya, mosques are particularly known for facilitating top down recruitment of potential 
radicals.216 This recruitment is of Somali refugees, as well as some locals. The other 
methods of recruitment are less organised and formal.217 From the points outlined above, 
some refugees are active perpetrators of radical extremist acts. The extent is minimal in 
relation to the overall number of refugees but not ascertainable in terms of a specific 
percentage. 
 4.5 Analysing Kenyan Legal Responses to Violent Somali Refugee Extremism 
To answer the question on whether legal responses are viable and important to consider, it 
must first be established that illegal means are ineffective and counterproductive. 
The first illegal means considered was forceful expulsion. Forceful expulsion is not an 
available legal remedy. The principle of ‘non-refoulment’ prohibits the forceful return of 
refugees/asylum seekers to their original countries. Article 33 of the 1951 Convention 
Relating to the Status of Refugees, to which Kenya is a signatory, prohibits the expulsion 
                                                          
213 ‘Lateef Margin: Hearing Starts, Adjourned for 4 Suspects in Kenya Mall Attack’, CNN 
http://www.cnn.com/2014/01/15/world/Africa/Kenya-Mall-Trial on 14 January 2014. 
214 Africa Union Incident Analysis, ‘Terrorist attack, Garissa University Kenya’, 2 April 2015 
http://caert.org.dz/incident-reports/Terrorist%20Attack%20In%20Garissa.pdf  
215United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, ‘Kenya Comprehensive refugee Program’, (2016), 3-
7.  
216 Ooko S, ‘Global Terrorism Threat: Youth Radicalization in Kenya’ unpublished, University of Nairobi, 
2014, 30.   




or return of a refugee back to a war zone.218 The article states as follows: 
 “No contracting state shall expel or return (‘refoul’) a refugee in any manner whatsoever 
to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of 
his race, religion, rationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion”. 
Kenya has domesticated this principle section 18 of the Refugee Act.219This act has by 
extension also domesticated the whole of the Convention relating to the status of Refugees. 
The effect of this is that Kenya has an obligation under both international law and local law 
to not refoul refugees in its jurisdiction. This applies even in instances where the refugees 
got into the country illegally.220   
As such, the Somali refugees domiciled in the territory of Kenya cannot be forcefully 
repatriated back to Somalia as the latter country is deeply unstable. Repatriation of refugees 
by force is this illegal for as long as Somalia is termed a war zone. 
Another illegal and ineffective attempt to curb terror is local crackdowns. The method that 
the Kenyan Government has come to utilise is one of fighting terror with terror. This 
approach errs from two standpoints: the means used are usually illegal, and they fail at 
reducing radical extremism.221 In fact, they seem to aggravate the problem, by creating 
conditions that promote radicalisation.  
In its February 2017 meeting report, the Rift valley Institute asserts that hard military and 
security approaches have not successfully addressed the threat of violent extremism and 
that a new approach of countering violent extremism has emerged that promotes preventive 
programming that aims to address the drivers of violent extremism that is a departure from 
reactive counterterrorism measures.222 Local integration of Somali refugees is presented as 
a counter violent extremism option. 
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Various human rights organizations’ reports and accounts have documented the abuses 
against Somali refugees in Kenya, by local authorities. These abuses were perpetrated in 
the name of preventing violent extremism. These abuses include periodic raids, beatings, 
police round-ups, extortion, torture and rapes.223 
Having looked at these two main illegal tools of attempting to deal with radical extremism, 
many things become clear. Crackdowns and forced repatriation result in human rights 
abuses. They also serve to increase the extremism they were trying to stamp out. They also 
seem to be devoid of order in the case of crackdowns and unnecessarily complicated in the 
case of forced repatriation. Thus, there is need for the law to provide orderly, effective and 
lasting solutions. 
The criminal justice system is one tool that the Kenyan Government can and has utilised 
to deal with radical extremist activity. Said activity is not limited to terror attacks. It 
involves planning and recruitment as well. This seems to a better option than the illegal 
means cited above, since they are not only enshrined in law but will be proven below to 
offer more lasting solutions. 
This means that all terrorist activities classified as crimes are tried through the appropriate 
legal channels.224 For example, the four attackers in the Westgate Attack were tried in a 
court of law taking heed of due process.225 
It is well known and documented that radical clerics use mosques to recruit and radicalise 
impressionable Somali refugee youth.226 Although crime detection and prevention is in the 
realm of the police force they must follow prescribed law. This is through the proper 
channels. For example, for evidence to be generally admissible in court the procedure and 
substance of searches and seizure must be followed. Investigations must also be as per the 
direction of the law. 
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There is also legislation on specific terrorism-related activity that grants special 
circumstances to aid in counter terrorism activities. This is a recent development as before 
2010 Kenya’s efforts to combat terrorism were hampered by a lack of legislation. Since 
then, the Security Laws (Amendment) Act changed 20 existing laws to strengthen Kenya’s 
anti-terror legislative framework.227The new law created agencies to deal specifically with 
the terror threat. These included the anti-terrorism police unit, a bomb disposal unit and a 
cyber forensics investigative unit. The Kenya Defence Forces – army, air force, and navy 
- are now also legislated to be involved. Previously weren’t actively involved in 
transnational counter-terrorism efforts.  
The most recent development was the enactment of the Prevention of Terrorism Act, which 
grants special powers for special circumstances relating to the subject matter of the Act.228 
For example, the Kenya Council for Legal Reform’s finding that the act allows for the 
suspension of some rights of arrested persons. 
In conclusion, Kenya has come a long way in legislating against terrorism and using legal 
channels to counter terrorist activity, even though some of the laws have been declared 
unconstitutional.229 However, the measures of criminal law are in the author’s view only 
punitive. Integration would offer a more restorative model of justice 
 4.6 Is Integration a Factor in Reducing Violent Extremism? 
It is the author’s hypothesis that integration and violent extremism are linked causally. The 
lack of integration has been established as one of the reasons for radicalization. 
Radicalization in turn is a prerequisite for violent extremism to occur. This is derived from 
the discussion in chapter two. In conclusion, integration is a factor that if implemented has 
the possibility of reducing violent extremism. This possibility will be explored by the sub-
questions below. 
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 4.7 How far are the Somali refugees in Kenya integrated into the local host 
population? 
Somali refugees in Kenya have been shown as above to be divided into two classes. The 
first class are those living in the refugee camps, while the second class are those who live 
in urban centres, especially in Nairobi. Based on these two classes, a distinction can be 
made in terms of levels of social integration. 
It can be said generally that the urban population is de-facto integrated (it is also one of the 
assumptions of this study), with room for exceptions. They are still refugees, and thus are 
not legally integrated. It can also be said generally that the population of Somali refugees 
in the camps is not integrated in any way.230 
The answer is not black and white, yes and no. There are varying shades of grey. Kenyan 
journalist, Rasna Warah has highlighted the Kenyan state and local population’s 
antagonistic attitude towards ethnic Somalis- both Kenyan and Somali. She interrogates 
the problem of the mistreatment of ethnic Somalis by highlighting the abuses they face in 
the Kenyan state; and discrimination and hostile attitude they face from the public.231 
In her article in the Journal for Refugee Studies, Elizabeth H. Campbell supports the idea 
of local integration of urban Somali refugees in Kenya arguing that they are not an 
economic burden as they are self-sufficient.232 Her whole study extensively shows how far 
from integration Somali refugees are.233 
To conclude, the urban population of Somali refugees appears to be relatively well 
integrated into the local population. While this latter group of refugees is de-facto 
integrated into the local host community, they like the encamped refugees are not legally 
integrated and this is perceived to exacerbate the security risk.234 
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 4.8 What are the reasons as to why the Somali refugees in Kenya are not integrated 
into the local population? 
There are classes of reasons: socio-cultural, legal, and political. For purposes of clarity 
factors such as personal and individual psychological factors will not be considered. This 
is because (as outlined in the second chapter) they vary widely on a case-by-case basis. 
The main legal reason for a low integration rate is the nature of integration itself in Kenya. 
The process of legal integration is outlined in the Kenyan Citizenship and Immigration 
Act.235 The Constitution also lists the requirements.236 For some refugees these 
requirements are too stringent to enable legal integration, and do not take account of factors 
outside of their control. De-facto integration is the closest form of integration available 
only to the urban-based refugees. The camp-based refugees remain completely 
unintegrated. 
The primary social reason is a sense of identity and isolation. The main causes of this are 
radicalization and Radical clerics are one reason. In this dynamic relationship, it is easy for 
radical individuals to instil their ideas and attitudes in young, receptive and older Muslims 
alike.237 The ideals instilled in them are usually negative towards the host country. Thus, 
even those who can integrate come to prefer not to. 
Perceived religious differences play a major role in isolating the Somali refugees from the 
local host population. In Europe, the Muslim population is usually marginalised and 
underrepresented as established in chapter two, even when legally integrated. Kenya too is 
plagued with similar facts in the integration of Muslims into the Kenyan society as 
citizens.238 
In a study done in 2015, the major factor that increasing the probability in youth 
radicalization in Kenya is the perception of social exclusion and marginalization.239 This 
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includes lack of participation in key issues that affect the country, under representation in 
government, mistreatment of Muslims based on their religion. These youth make no effort 
to integrate. 
On the political front the prevalent view of Islam propagated by foreign powers is a 
political one, that has been adopted by the local Kenyans not Muslim or of Somali descent. 
An opinion poll conducted in 2017 shows that most American Muslims and British 
Muslims feel like the ‘war on terror’ is a ‘war on Islam’.240  
This is even though most Muslim communities do not believe nor condone violent 
extremism done in the name of jihad.241 This attitude has been adopted by both non-Muslim 
and Muslim alike. Such views create a socio-political chasm between the host population 
and refugees. 
In a study done by Usalama Watch in 2014 showed that due to the position Kenya has with 
European countries, any internal security agencies deployed to respond to terrorist attack 
are not done without further alienating communities whose support and cooperation is 
essential in the fight against terrorism.242  
Under social and political identity crises, it is common for Muslim youths in foreign 
countries feel alienated from the community.243 In the Netherlands, Muslim-Dutch youth 
feel alienated from their parents and the Dutch community. This meeting of two worlds 
that is the Western and the Muslin world cause an identity crisis.244 
As a way out of this isolation, such youth tend to find an identity in the Ummah that binds 
them with other Muslims facing or having gone through a similar plight of identity crisis.245 
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This leads to a failure to socially integrate, as they cannot see themselves as members of 
the host country. 
 The war between state agencies and refugees then becomes perpetual. This is because of 
the reactionary effect that isolation and harassment has on the refugee population. The 
effect is one where reactionary violence is bred. Unchecked and blatant exclusion from 
group membership can instigate negative and aggressive behaviours and attitudes.246  
The state has had a large part to play by using excessive force which the radicals then take 
advantage of.247 Brendon J and Dominic R have also pointed out that the Kenya security 
establishment’s treatment of Kenyan Muslims and other communities (like the refugee 
community) have led to anger, frustration and, in some cases, radicalization.248 Radicalized 
populations do not integrate. 
In conclusion, there are many reasons as to why refugees of different groups do not 
integrate. The author is of the opinion that failure to integrate could involve one or more 
factors at any time, but that failure to legally integrate is the most devastating one. 
 4.9 Could the systematic integration of Somali refugees among host communities 
produce a reduction in violent extremism in Kenya?  
The answer to this question is composed of two parts. Part one would be what constitutes 
properly executed systematic integration. Part two would be whether proof of such 
integration exists. An extension of the second part is whether integration, even imperfectly 
executed, has a lessening effect on violent extremism. 
What does proper systematic integration look like? As per Alexandra Fielden, local 
integration as a durable solution has three elements.249 The first is a legal process where 
the refugee attains rights in the host country. Secondly, a sustainable means of living is 
established. Lastly, a social and cultural process of adaptation to the host country takes 
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place. Others such as Da Costa only argue for the legal process as being necessary.250  
If one were looking for a most comprehensive policy on refugee integration and the 
guidelines for pursuing it, the European Union (EU) seems to lead the way. In the latest 
rankings of refugee integration, of the 27 top countries most of them were European.251 A 
UN investigation of the EU’s refugee integration policy reveals that it adheres to the model 
given by Alexandra Fielden.252 Some elements such as mental health and healthcare plans 
were even included to mind the refugee’s quality of life. 
Since the scope of this study is primarily legal, the legal aspect will be looked at with the 
assumption that socio-cultural and economic integration will be provided for by the state. 
The focus will be on Kenyan integration policy. The process of legal integration is outlined 
in the Kenyan Citizenship and Immigration Act.253 The Constitution also lists the 
requirements.254 
The analysis into the causes of radicalization in Chapter Two shed light on the answer to 
this question. It has been shown that radicalization, though having many causes, has a lack 
of integration as its primary cause.255  Radicalization has in turn been proven to be the 
determining factor in whether radical extremist acts are perpetrated by the individual.  
Individual social behaviour is attributed to some extent with identification with social 
groups. How we behave to a large extent depends on whom we identify with.256 Integration 
would make refugees identify with the host country and become less likely to attack it. 
Proof that systematic, legal integration enhances social cohesion and a sense of national 
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belonging then leads to an important proposition. The European example of how social 
isolation comes about given in Chapter Two provides a reasonable framework.257 The 
proposition is that since the social isolation element has been removed, violent extremism 
no longer appears as a reaction to it.258 Unchecked and blatant exclusion from group 
membership can instigate negative and aggressive behaviours and attitudes.259 This effect 
would not take place in a system of systematic integration, removing one of the largest 
reasons for violent extremism. 
The issue of cultural integration is more complex, especially when looking at religion. A 
population of European Muslims have integrated in all ways but cultural.260  This 
persistence to remain culturally different despite generations in the host country is a pattern 
exhibited by Kenyan Somalis, most of whom are Muslim. The same pattern is thus 
expected of the refugees after integration. 
Social integration is a process that can take place naturally. An example is the urban Somali 
refugee population in Eastleigh, Nairobi. While this latter group of refugees is de-facto 
integrated into the local host community, they like the encamped refugees are not legally 
integrated and this is perceived to exacerbate the security risk.261 Only legal integration 
would complete this half-integration and reduce the security risk. 
Local integration of Somali refugees can be presented as a counter to violent extremism. 
Integration of refugees would also remove the aggravating force of violent crackdowns by 
Kenyan forces.262 There would be none to harass as refugees. This removal of a factor that 
enhances radicalisation would result in a drop in violent extremism. It would also bring to 
a halt the violent abuse that aids terror organisations in recruitment of violent radicals.263 
There is a response to the argument against integration on grounds of high economic cost, 
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since the local population would support the newcomers. In her article in the Journal for 
Refugee Studies, Elizabeth H. Campbell supports the idea of local integration of urban 
Somali refugees in Kenya. She provides an economic model for a self-sufficient integrated 
refugee lifestyle.264 This would be better than maintaining a refugee population dependent 
on handouts, which would still be and is a financial burden. 
 4.10 Are there means other than integration that have served to deradicalize and 
avoid violent extremist activity? 
It is clear that although the state takes liberties with refugee rights, there is a legal 
framework in place that presumes innocence. Such protections of refugee rights as 
explained above leave the Government weak in terms of measures to prevent terrorist 
activity. There arises a problem regarding the denial of services and hosting to refugees on 
grounds of crimes or inconsistency with the constitution. Such expulsions or arrests can 
only be done after the fact of the crime. They offer no protections whatsoever against 
refugees who become radicalised after entering the country. The adage ‘Prevention is better 
than cure’ is thrown to the wind in favour of legal protections and the presumption of 
innocence.  
Since the scope of this study is primarily legal, the legal aspect will be looked at with the 
assumption that socio-cultural and economic integration will be provided for by the state. 
The focus will be on Kenyan integration policy. The process of legal integration is outlined 
in the Kenyan Citizenship and Immigration Act.265 The Constitution also lists the 
requirements.266 
The ultimate proof of integration working would be a marked decrease in violent 
extremism. This can be measure using the Kenyan Somali community, who are legally and 
economically integrated. A report by the Rift Valley Institute confirms this.267  
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Further proof that integration can work comes from the stated Kalobeyei integrated 
settlement which hosts both refugees and the local community. It is working at a solution 
of integration. Refugees are also working with NGOs to make a living from their skills. 
The two other possibilities of inducing change have been outlined above and will be 
repeated as a conclusion. The legal framework and its implementation can be greatly 
improved upon. Secondly, deradicalization as shown in Chapter Three could also be a 
viable solution. 
In conclusion, integration as an effective solution to violent extremism can only be realised 
where the integration is complete, as defined above. Even in cases of partial integration, 
there appears to be a reduction in the levels or violent extremism. Partial integration would 





FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 5.1 Introduction 
This chapter gives a detailed summary of the problem of radicalization and violent 
extremism globally and in Kenya through a historical context, the causes of radicalization 
and violent extremism in general with particular focus on those prevalent in Kenya, the 
counter-terrorism interventions and their effectiveness and the integration of Somali 
refugees and the connection it has to radicalization. This chapter further outlines the 
conclusion of the study and recommendation of the study. 
 5.2 An Introduction to Radicalization and Violent Extremism 
The study found out the causes of radicalization cannot be attributed to just one factor. This 
is because radicalization is an interaction of complex factors that all work together.268 
These factors can be divided into two spheres. The first sphere consists of the external, 
social and individual level that differ in the extent to which they influence one to 
radicalization. The external level consists of the political, economic and cultural causes of 
radicalization. The social factor consists of the social identification and network dynamics 
that influence the rate of radicalization. Whereas the individual level tackles the 
psychological characteristics and personal experiences that contribute to radicalization.269 
In the second sphere lies the catalysts to radicalization. These are not factors that lay the 
foundation for the process of radicalization, rather they are factors that speed up the process 
of radicalization.270 Catalysts can be divided into two main categories; triggering events 
and recruitment. Both of which have tremendous influence on the rate of radicalization of 
an individual. From this chapter it became clear that the factors that influence radicalization 
are many.271 However, for radicalization and consequently extreme violence to be stopped 
the mechanisms used should touch on the root of the issue which is usually the foundational 
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factors in the first sphere.272 The study in chapter 3 was able to evaluate the Counter 
Terrorism mechanisms that are used in Kenya with a particular focus in Eastleigh. 
 5.3 Counter Terrorism Mechanisms 
This study found in chapter 3 that there are various mechanisms that are used to counter 
terrorism globally. Kenya in particular applies on a national wide scale initiatives such as 
the establishment and use of the NCTC, joining the AMISOM initiative, conducting 
Operation Linda Nchi, focusing on substantive legislative changes that will make law 
enforcement easier when it comes to terrorism, using diplomatic efforts to stabilize 
problematic neighbouring countries such as Sudan and Somalia, participating in regional, 
international and collaborative efforts to increase the skill, equipment and information of 
the Kenyan Police force and using NGOs to help in the fight against radicalization and 
violent extremism of the youth.273  
Although the efforts of the government to counter terrorism in Kenya since 2003 are 
recommendable, their effectiveness has been curtailed by technical incapacities, 
corruption, poor interagency law enforcement coordination, insufficient training and lack 
of resources. Additionally,  in Muslim populated areas such as Eastleigh that are termed as 
high risk areas the government has resulted in using risk reduction strategies, security 
operation, community policing and random searches as Counter Terrorism mechanism. 
These strategies are a show of effort but they clearly work to control radicalization rather 
than prevent radicalization.274  
Furthermore, the Counter Terrorism mechanisms that are deployed tend to be more military 
based and harsher in terms of upholding human rights of refugees. It is due to this that most 
residents in Eastleigh that are Muslim of Somali decent feel target and discriminated 
against, whenever the above mentioned strategies are used in Eastleigh. This study 
therefore concluded on the ineffectiveness of Counter Terrorism mechanisms in Kenya and 
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urges using mechanisms that touch on root causes of radicalization such as lack of social 
integration that brings about discrimination.275 
 5.4 Integration as a solution to violent extremism 
The core function of chapter four was to prove or disprove the hypotheses outlined in 
Chapter Three, through research questions. This chapter will first looked at the validity of 
the claims that Somali refugees are involved in violent extremist activity. Focus was on the 
respondents of this study: the urban Somali population in Eastleigh, though the rural 
populations will be considered as well. It was found that refugees participate in violent 
extremism. 276 This was attributed partly to the government’s policy of violence. 
Thereafter, the possibility or impossibility of integration being a factor in reducing violent 
extremism was investigated. It is at this point that the arguments will become more local 
and suited to the subjects of this study, i.e. the urban Somali refugees in Kenya. The level 
of integration of Somali refugees was found to be low in all aspects. Only then were the 
reasons behind the lack of integration be questioned and answered. Among them were 
socio-political reasons, along with legal reasons. For example, access to information, 
political views, and negative stereotypes. 
A brief legal analysis of terror as a phenomenon and legal and illegal tactics against it was 
given, where it was shown that Kenya made great strides forward but was still lacking. It 
was shown that it is possible to reduce violent extremism in theory given that integration 
was shown to affect rate of radicalisation under the second chapter, with the example of 
the Kenyan Somali community being given.277 The study maintained that if properly done, 
the population of Somali refugees engaging in terrorist acts would reduce. The study also 
briefly mentioned the process of legal integration and understated its importance.278 
 5.5 Conclusion 
The study found that partial integration partially reduces instances of violent extremism 
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and full integration greatly reduces instances of violent extremism. The study also found 
that a portion of violent extremism is unrelated to integration of refugees. Rather, terror 
cells and networks can conduct violent extremist activity with little to no refugee 
assistance. The study also found that the social differences between non-Islamic Kenyans 
and Muslim groups is large enough to cause social divide.  
The study concluded that some refugees take part in violent extremist activity, though some 
of the radicalisation is at the fault of the Kenyan Government due to their ultra-violent 
tactics. 
 5.6 Recommendations 
Based on the study’s findings I recommend that Somali refugees be integrated in order of 
their level of social and economic integration. Those in urban centres would be integrated 
first as they have been shown to be integrated in all ways but the legal. Integration should 
be followed using the tripartite of social, legal and economic. Such integration would 
require formation of a new policy and laws and would preferably be begun at the 
Parliamentary Committee stage. I therefore recommend that a Parliamentary Committee 
on integration be assembled. 
I recommend that an amendment to the laws that follow be made. First, the Prevention of 
Terrorism Act be amended in light of its unconstitutional elements as per the direction of 
the Judiciary. The second is that the Refugees Act be amended to remove the distinction in 
legal status between statutory and non-statutory refugee status. They should be merged 
while maintaining the requirement for registration so as to enable service delivery. This 
would enable the time period that refugees spend waiting for documentation could count 
towards their citizenship application. This would enable integration of unregistered persons 
should the state mechanisms fail to recognise them as refugees due to lack of encampment. 
I recommend that a formal report be made to the National Cohesion and Integration 
Commission by a body with the requisite capacity and information regarding the degree of 
legal and social isolation of the refugee community. This is in hopes that the Commission 
will look into possible ways of bridging the cultural and social divide between Somali 
refugees and other groups. Should this prove to be a viable option, the gains on enhancing 
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socialization may reduce radicalisation of refugees. This would in turn produce a reduction 
in radicalist extremist activity. 
I recommend that more research into the rehabilitation of radicalised youth be done, by 
bodies with the requisite capacity (such as outlined in the NSCVE arguments above). This 
is because the limited information and strategies available suggest high value in the 
deployment of this CVE strategy. 
I finally recommend that the encampment laws and policies put in place by the government 
in relation to urban populations of refugees be reviewed. This is because they are clearly 
partly efficient and only serve to deny partly integrated refugees full integration through 
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